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NOTE

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2451st MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 1 June 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2451)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);
   Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT: It gives me great pleasure, at this first meeting of the Security Council for the month of June, to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation of Zaire, and to Mr. Umba di Lutete, Permanent Representative of Zaire to the United Nations, for their services as President of the Security Council during the month of May. Both guided the work of the Council with great diplomatic skill during a particularly demanding period and I am sure that I speak for all members in expressing to them our deep appreciation.

2. On behalf of the delegation of Zimbabwe, I wish to say how happy and grateful we are to succeed our Zairian brothers, and to share with them the stewardship of the Council in its consideration of the situation in Namibia. We are greatly inspired by the exemplary manner in which they guided the work of the Council during the month of May.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:

Letter dated 12 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15760);

Letter dated 13 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15761)

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at previous meetings on this item [*2439th to 2444th, and 2446th to 2450th meetings*], I invite the representative of Mauritius to take a place at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, the Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Upper Volta, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Maudave (Mauritius) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Zarif (Afghanistan), Mr. Hadj Azzout (Algeria), Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Muñiz (Argentina), Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Mr. Hashim (Bangladesh), Mr. Moseley (Barbados), Mr. Adjibade (Benin), Mr. Mogwe (Botswana), Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Trucco (Chile), Mr. Albán Holguín (Colombia), Mr. Malmierca (Cuba), Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Suja (Czechoslovakia), Mr. Al-Ashtal (Democratic Yemen), Mr. Khalil (Egypt), Mr. Ibrahim (Ethiopia), Mr. Davin (Gabon), Mr. Blain (Gambia), Mr. Ott (German Democratic Republic), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. Gbeho (Ghana), Mr. Taylor (Grenada), Mr. Kaba (Guinea), Mr. Rácz (Hungary), Mr. Rao (India), Mr. Kusumaatmadja (Indonesia), Mr. Serajzadeh (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Shearer (Jamaica), Mr. Kuroda (Japan), Mr. Wabuge (Kenya), Mr. Abulhassan (Kuwait), Mrs. Jones (Liberia), Mr. Burwin (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Tan Sri Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), Mr. Traore (Mali), Mr. Muñoz Ledo (Mexico), Mr. Erdenechuluun

(Mongolia), Mr. Mrani Zentar (Morocco), Mr. Chissano (Mozambique), Mr. Oumarou (Niger), Mr. Bolokor (Nigeria), Mr. Cabrera (Panama), Mr. Jamal (Qatar), Mr. Marinescu (Romania), Mr. Niasse (Senegal), Ms. Gonthier (Seychelles), Mr. Stevens (Sierra Leone), Mr. Adan (Somalia), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Fonseka (Sri Lanka), Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), Mr. Slim (Tunisia), Mr. Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Owiny (Uganda), Mr. Salim (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Bassole (Upper Volta), Mr. Chaderton-Matos (Venezuela), Mr. Le Kim Chung (Viet Nam), Mr. Mojsov (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Goma (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

4. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

5. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the decision taken at the 2439th meeting, I invite Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Nujoma took a place at the Council table.

6. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Venezuela. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

7. Mr. CHADERTON MATOS (Venezuela) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Sir, we are pleased to see you assuming the presidency of the Council this month. Your qualities as a diplomat and your long international experience as the representative of Zimbabwe guarantee positive leadership during these meetings.

8. We wish to congratulate the President of the Council for the month of May on his skilful leadership of the Council which led to the adoption of resolution 532 (1983).

9. My country wishes to thank you, Sir, and the members of the Council for giving us this opportunity to participate in the debate.

10. Once again, the United Nations is faced with the efforts of the South African racist régime to maintain its unlawful occupation of Namibia in disregard of the decisions of the Organization and in open rebellion against the international community.

11. We Venezuelans feel very particularly committed to the cause of the Namibian people. Venezuela is a traditionally democratic anti-racist and anti-colonialist country. It was a member of the Security Council when resolution 435 (1978) was adopted. For a number of years it has been a very active member of the United Nations Council for Namibia, whose important work in support of independence for Namibia we have long supported under the efficient leadership of Mr. Paul Lusaka.

12. Recently two important meetings were held, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at New Delhi in March, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, in Paris in April. We endorse the views which were put forward at those meetings and support the appeals for a speedy settlement of the problem of the independence of Namibia.

13. In the face of South African usurpation, we affirm the right of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom, democracy, territorial integrity and national independence.

14. These rights of the Namibian people can be exercised by effective implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). That is the sole basis for the peaceful settlement of the problem of Namibia within the framework of the United Nations.

15. South Africa's stubbornness, the plundering of the natural resources of Namibia by the Pretoria racists, the constant acts of aggression by their military forces against the front-line countries and other independent African countries constitute a serious threat to regional and world peace and must be stopped.

16. We cannot sit idly by and witness the failure of the many efforts made over the past years for the independence of Namibia. Instead of being discouraged, we find even more reason, even more encouragement to support the Namibian people in their struggle for independence.

17. We wish to emphasize and pay a tribute to the effectiveness and usefulness of the necessary steps taken by the Secretary-General in this direction, with his moral authority, to promote a peaceful settlement to this conflict which calls for responsibility and serious thought on the part of the parties concerned. We must pledge our full support to him in the exercise of his special responsibility.

18. This is a good time to remind the Council of the recent background to the problems of southern Africa which constitute a threat to international peace and security.

19. Zimbabwe is an ideal example of an intelligent and realistic solution to a serious problem arising from colonialism and illegality. This solution led to independence and democracy for that fraternal African nation. The spirit of Lancaster House is a positive precedent. If the political wisdom and pragmatism that underlay that spirit had been used to resolve other conflicts, there would be fewer tragedies in the world today. If political wisdom and pragmatism were to inspire all the parties concerned in the Namibian problem, then we could find a peaceful solution in keeping with resolution 435 (1978).

20. The presence of outside factors subsequent to resolution 435 (1978) is not conducive to the efforts to create an independent democratic State in Namibia. We note that the introduction of outside factors, far from neutralizing local or international extremist options as happened in earlier cases, may well strengthen these extremist options and increase their number to the detriment of the alternatives of peace and restraint, without which there can be no really independent, sovereign and democratic future for Namibia.

21. The United Nations vocation to further the independence of Namibia must be successfully fulfilled. Our inability to solve the problem has allowed the South African dictatorship to continue its unlawful occupation of Namibia, to oppress the people, exploit their resources and attack neighbouring countries, as has been shown by the recent military aggression against Mozambique.

22. There can be no peace on the African continent so long as the Namibian people are subject to these opprobrious policies. The independence of Namibia is necessary if there is to be a just and lasting peace in the region. Venezuela is deeply concerned about this deplorable situation. For this reason we support the efforts that have been made in good faith to solve the problem. We also support SWAPO, the authentic and legitimate representative of the people of Namibia, in its efforts to achieve independence, freedom and a democratic State that guarantees human rights and whose presence and influence are needed by the African community and the entire international community.

23. We hope that the resolution adopted yesterday will not be a dead letter but a great stride forward.

24. Before concluding I should like to read out a message sent yesterday by the President of Venezuela, Mr. Luis Herrera Campíns, to the President of the Council for the month of May.

[*The speaker read out the text quoted in document S/15807.*]

25. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Grenada, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

26. Mr. TAYLOR (Grenada): Sir, first of all I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. Perhaps I am fortunate that I am addressing the Council at this point, because it gives me an opportunity, immediately after the representative of Venezuela, to say a word of welcome to you. Our countries, Zimbabwe and Grenada, share a great deal. We have a common history of struggle, but perhaps more important to us at this time is the fact that, existentially, we are in the same boat. Therefore we are convinced that the work that was started and was effectively undertaken by the representative of Zaire, will be continued under your guidance.

27. The Council is meeting as a result of the virtually universal demand of the international community for decisive action towards independence for the Namibian people. These meetings are perhaps a good omen. Lamentably, however, these meetings of the Council cannot in themselves diminish our anger and frustration, which have come about as a result of four decades of fine oratory and well-intentioned resolutions but virtually no action. Here in the Council and also in the General Assembly we have produced a great deal of sometimes frightening thunder, but the political drought on the question of Namibia continues. We cannot lose sight of the fact that these meetings have been convened 17 years after the historic General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, terminating South Africa's Mandate over Namibia, 12 years after the equally historic advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,[1] which vindicated the General Assembly decision and further stated that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal, and five years after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978).

28. After all these years and after all these and other truly historic decisions, the racist South African Government, aided and abetted by its patrons and benefactors, continues, without compunction, to flout the will of the international community.

29. Over these years we have witnessed the savagery and ferocity of the racist *apartheid* monster as thousands of our brothers and sisters have been brutally and coldbloodedly murdered in Namibia and in South Africa. After all these years we know the *apartheid* monster and we know its ruthlessness and its propensity to procrastinate and prevaricate. However, we are alarmed at the fact that others, including a permanent member of this body, are prepared to support and defend South Africa's policies of genocide.

30. It is a well-known fact that Namibia is held hostage because the United States insists, by virtue of its policy of linkage, that Cuban internationalist forces must be withdrawn from the sister Republic of Angola before Namibia becomes independent. We utterly reject this so-called linkage policy because it makes the racist Pretoria régime more arrogant, intransigent and callous. It entices South Africa to continue its heinous crimes against humanity. Moreover, independence for our oppressed and exploited brothers and sisters of Namibia cannot be predicated upon a diminution of Angolan sovereignty. South Africa and whoever supports its crimes cannot be given the right to establish the price of Namibian independence; that price the Namibians are paying in blood. The front-line and other African States support the genuine aspirations of our heroic Namibian brothers and sisters at great economic cost and at the cost of the lives of innocent citizens.

31. Indeed, only a few days ago, the Pretoria Fascists mounted another of their self-styled punitive air raids against the sister republic of Mozambique at the very moment the Council was commencing these deliberations. South Africa's baseless theories of racial superiority make it as irrational and mindless as such theories made its ideological mentors—Hitler's Nazi gangs—more than

four decades ago. Appeasement enticed the Nazis into making greater and more and more ludicrous demands. Pampering would certainly make the racist monster more pig-headed.

32. We welcome, as we have always done, every effort to bring Namibia's enslavement, this very sad chapter in Africa's history, to an end peacefully. However, we harbour no illusions. Only the intensification of the armed struggle will force South Africa to let Namibia go, and that is why we are convinced that the struggle in Namibia is clear-cut. In that struggle there is no neutrality, no middle ground, because, as things are at the moment, if we talk about equitableness in a struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed we are quite deliberately talking about hypocrisy. Today the struggle is clear-cut. One can be either on the side of the oppressed Namibian people or on the side of their racist oppressors. Those that choose to protect and defend South Africa must cease to lecture us on questions of justice and democracy.

33. In conclusion, I wish to state, in the name of the Government and people of Grenada, that we commend the front-line States for the unstinting support that they continue to give to the liberation struggles in southern Africa. We commend also the efforts made by the Secretary-General to resolve the issues around Namibia peacefully. I also take this opportunity to reaffirm Grenada's solidarity with and eternal support for our brothers and sisters in Namibia in their struggle for independence under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic leaders.

34. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Colombia, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

35. Mr. ALBÁN HOLGUÍN (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I should like first of all to express to you, Mr. President, and to the other members of the Council my appreciation for this opportunity to take part in this important debate. I am also very pleased to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. We are certain and confident that with your fine qualities you will be able effectively to guide the Council's work.

36. The presence here of some 40 Foreign Ministers from Africa, Asia and Latin America testifies to the magnitude of the problem of Namibia. These meetings, together with two great international conferences—the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, at New Delhi, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, in Paris,—are an indication of the great international interest in this question and of the need for a speedy solution to it.

37. At both of those international conferences my country joined in supporting the cause of the Namibian people as it has been doing for 15 years in its capacity as a member of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

38. In this dual capacity, my delegation calls on the Security Council to take the action necessary to bring about strict compliance with its resolution 435 (1978), which approved the independence plan for Namibia. My country considers that the Council must shoulder its full responsibility and must therefore define the specific objectives, in terms of deadlines, so that the independence process can finally be brought to fruition. Having heard the statements of the various Powers, we believe that the necessary awareness and political will exist so that the Council can act accordingly.

39. The Secretary-General too has inspired hope in us. Since he began his term more than a year ago he has devoted himself with fervour, patience, intelligence and realism to devising a way of bringing about an agreement. At the Paris Conference his dedication inspired us to seek and obtain full support for his efforts. We are convinced that, with the concerted support of the Council, the Secretary-General is the best person to speed the fulfilment of the aspirations of the Namibian people for freedom.

40. We believe that there is reason for optimism. The Secretary-General himself, in his report on the present situation [*S/15776*], has told us that the sole outstanding questions concern the choice of an electoral system and the settling of some problems relating to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) and its composition. The Secretary-General concludes that the process is in an advanced stage and that consultations and negotiations have gone far enough to guarantee the achievement of a just, peaceful and final settlement of the question of Namibia.

41. Colombia considers that this could be the Council's last chance to provide the support for which the Secretary-General is calling and which he is fully entitled to expect. A further round of negotiations, without any snags, excuses or delays, could lead us to a final agreement.

42. SWAPO has called on the Council to compel South Africa to sign a cease-fire agreement, as set out in the United Nations plan, to open the way to a final settlement of the conflict. In the dramatic words of the President of SWAPO: "The Namibian people have already suffered for too long . . ." [*2439th meeting, para. 150.*] We all agree with him. It is time for violence, selfishness and the lack of self-restraint to come to an end and for us to give common sense a chance.

43. The unjust existence of this final bastion of colonialism in Africa has been responsible for the world Organization's great efforts being committed to and channelled towards its solution, when they could have been dedicated to the full development of those great and invaluable human, technical, natural and financial resources of Namibia and of southern Africa in general.

44. Namibia must, without delay, gain the independence to which it is entitled and for which it yearns. Every day that passes without freedom for that country is a day of

mourning for countries that cherish such freedom and a source of shame for the international community and of discredit for the United Nations itself. No people, no nation, can in the future be proud of any victory in the field of human rights so long as the Namibian people continue to be downtrodden as they are now. No political, economic or military consideration can be invoked to the detriment of the sacred fundamental rights and freedoms of the Namibians. All the members of the Council know this. We place our hope and our trust in their action.

45. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Cyprus. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

46. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): It is with special warmth that I congratulate you, Sir, the representative of a country with which we have the friendliest ties, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. I feel certain that, under your able guidance and with your great diplomatic skills, the deliberations of the Council will be successfully concluded.

47. I should like also to congratulate the retiring President of the Council. During part of May, the presidency was assumed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, to whom also we pay a tribute on the excellent manner in which he conducted the work of the Council.

48. The question of Namibia is a clear case of colonialism, illegal foreign occupation and racism persisting in blatant violation of the rights of the Namibian people and in defiance of the very authority of the United Nations under whose direct responsibility the Territory of Namibia was placed 15 years ago.

49. The United Nations has set itself the noble task of leading the Namibians to independence and it has a duty and an obligation to fulfil its responsibilities with regard to that task. On this, I am sure, we all agree; yet Namibia remains illegally occupied by South Africa and its people are denied their right to self-determination. Our convictions must now, more than ever before, be matched by our deeds.

50. Cyprus would like to stress once again in this very important body its commitment to and strong support for the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, which provides the only peaceful procedure for a negotiated settlement of this major international problem. We stand firmly by the plan and demand its early implementation without any modification, qualification or delay. As I indicated earlier, the question of Namibia is a clear case of decolonization. It should not therefore be linked to other extraneous issues in the region.

51. The current situation in Namibia poses a serious threat to international peace and security. The constantly provocative and arrogant attitude of South Africa in flouting the repeated appeals of the international community, together with the failure to implement United Nations resolutions, aggravates the already explosive situation in southern Africa.

52. South Africa, regrettably, continues to organize and further elaborate its machinery of repression against the Namibian people, denying them their most fundamental rights and freedoms. Furthermore, South Africa continually increases its military presence in Namibia, thus reinforcing its illegal occupation of the Territory and the exploitation and plunder of the rich natural resources of Namibia, in violation of Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia, enacted in 1974 by the United Nations Council for Namibia.[2]

53. In order to consolidate and prolong its illegal occupation of Namibia, South Africa constantly expands its aggressive policies throughout the southern African region. Once again, Cyprus expresses its vehement and unequivocal condemnation of the large-scale incursions of South African forces into neighbouring front-line States, as manifested in its most recent air raid against Mozambique, its invasion and occupation of the southern part of Angola and its destabilization policy in the neighbouring States.

54. It therefore becomes increasingly imperative that we act as a matter of urgency. The United Nations, with the exception of imposing the arms embargo, has so far concentrated on exerting moral pressure on South Africa through its resolutions. However, no concrete results have so far been produced and the Pretoria régime continues to cause frustration and disappointment to the Namibian people and the world at large.

55. As a result of this constantly deteriorating situation, suffering, exploitation and oppression continue to be the painful everyday characteristics of life for the Namibians. But despite the bitterness and frustration it creates, this situation gives rise to strengthened solidarity, determination and unity among the people of Namibia and among the international community, which consistently supports their struggle, as recently declared by the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris.

56. Cyprus, for its part, itself struggling under conditions of gross injustice to safeguard its own independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and non-aligned status, will, as it has consistently done in the past, continue to support the noble cause of the people of Namibia.

57. As one of the members of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Cyprus joins all those that are in the vanguard of the struggle for the liberation of Namibia and in the fight at the international level.

58. We firmly recognize SWAPO, whose President, Mr. Sam Nujoma, we warmly welcome here, as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. We trust that their hard and painful struggle will soon produce the desired result: an independent and united Namibia, with territorial integrity, including Walvis Bay and the offshore islands.

59. We know from our own experience that resolutions alone cannot lead to the desired goal; it is their effective implementation that is of paramount importance. The implementation of the United Nations plan is long overdue. It is the duty of the United Nations, and especially the Council, to take the necessary steps and measures to ensure the expeditious implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978). The Council therefore correctly decided yesterday, through resolution 532 (1983), to indicate a time-frame for the implementation of th resolution, to keep the matter under active review and to enhance the role of the Secretary-General.

60. The Secretary-General, in these most turbulent times, is being increasingly accorded active roles in various situations around the world. This can be attributed to his excellent personal and diplomatic qualities and to the confidence and trust he enjoys from the international community. We express our deep appreciation of his tireless efforts and dedication to the cause of Namibia.

61. Should South Africa again fail to comply with the Council decisions, the Council should be prepared to act under Chapter VII of the Charter, otherwise a heavy blow will be dealt to the aspirations not only of the Namibian people but of humanity as a whole, which aspires to a world of freedom and justice.

62. Cyprus stands firmly and unswervingly by the side of Namibia in the midst of its own tragedy and tribulations. With its independence and territorial integrity shattered by a foreign army of occupation, Cyprus continues its peaceful efforts in the quest for freedom, justice and vindication.

63. Although it appears the world over that those who demolish principles cannot easily be converted into adherents of justice, I should like to express the hope that, through international solidarity and pressure, the people of Namibia, together with all others who are wronged, oppressed or downtrodden in this turbulent world, will ultimately be vindicated.

64. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Ghana. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

65. Mr. GBEHO (Ghana): I should like to begin my statement, Sir, by congratulating you most warmly on your accession to the presidency of the Council for this month. It is an honour richly deserved by reason of your personal qualities as an outstanding diplomat and distinguished representative of your country. You have already given ample proof of these qualities in your participation in the deliberations of the Council, and of course I am confident that you will preside over the Council's consideration of the all-important question of Namibia with the same objectivity, the same skill and the same tact and, above all, a commitment to the furtherance of the aims and objectives of the Council and the United Nations as a whole in the maintenance of international peace and security.

66. The continued subjugation of the people of Namibia under the oppressive and racist colonial régime of *apartheid* South Africa constitutes one of the gravest threats to world peace. Recent events in that Territory and the actions of the Pretoria régime in southern Africa generally deepen the threat. It is because of that serious threat that we have called into question the handling of the issue by the Western contact group, in which so much hope for a peaceful solution had in vain been invested by many of us in Africa.

67. The people and Government of Ghana have been particularly frustrated and disappointed by the continually elusive search for independence for the Territory because Namibia represents one of the major obstacles to the attainment of our historic commitment to the achievement of the total liberation of the African continent from all vestiges of colonialism and racist imperialism. *Apartheid* South Africa's continued occupation and control of Namibia in defiance of repeated requests by the United Nations to grant freedom and independence to the long-suffering people of that Territory are not only an obdurate and hopeless attempt to stem the tide of history but also an affront to the dignity of the Afican continent and the international community as a whole. To Ghana, in particular, it is a painful and most distressing situation.

68. It is indeed painful to realize that the racist and abhorrent régime of South Africa is emboldened and sustained in its continued intransigence and defiance with regard to Namibia by the support it enjoys from some of the most powerful countries that are in a position to bring it to heel and, worse still, have been entrusted by the world community with the responsibility of seeking a peaceful solution to the Namibian independence dispute.

69. What, indeed, have we seen—especially over the past two years—if not a serious retrogression in the prospects for a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia? Instead of rapid progress, as we had all hoped and expected, towards the attainment of independence through the exercise of the inalienable right of the people of that Territory to elect their own government and rulers, South Africa and its powerful friends have employed every subterfuge to frustrate the restoration of freedom and justice to the people of Namibia.

70. These tactics have been amply documented in the relevant United Nations reports on Namibia and I need not go into them at any length, as representatives are well aware of and have access to them. Suffice it to highlight two main elements in the most recent attempts to undermine and frustrate the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978).

71. First, an attempt had been made by South Africa and its supporters to block the inevitable attainment by SWAPO of constitutional power through the ballot box by the proposal of a most ridiculous and disingenuous electoral arrangement, which would have resulted in the establishment of a so-called combination system for Namibia—a most peculiar voting aberration, unheard of anywhere else in the world. It took the firm opposition of

SWAPO, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Non-Aligned Movement to put a stop—a final stop, we hope—to this particular electoral machination and act of mischief-making by South Africa.

72. Secondly—and this is perhaps the more serious and irrelevant subterfuge, which has brought the Namibia issue to its present impasse—there has been an attempt made to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Again, this has been unanimously opposed at every turn, not only by SWAPO but also by the front-line States, the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the overwhelming majority of countries in the international community.

73. It is South Africa and a handful of its powerful supporters alone that have persisted, against all reason, in dictating to the Government and people of Angola which troops they may allow on their soil in the exercise of their sovereign right to defend their territorial integrity. The most surprising aspect of this peculiar line of argument is that nothing is said about the South African invasion forces still occupying parts of Angolan territory. It is convenient for the proponents of the linkage of Cuban troop withdrawal with the Namibia independence issue not only to forget that the Namibia question has nothing to do with the Angolan Government's defence of its territorial integrity, but also to pretend that Angola itself faces no threat of further aggression and invasion from South Africa. Besides, what may we ask, are the South African-backed and armed UNITA [*National Union for the Total Independence of Angola*] bandits doing inside Angola? Whom are they working for, if not international capitalism and imperialism, which are hand in glove with racist South Africa? No one except South Africa and its mentors has seen any wisdom in the linkage theory, and it is our hope that this debate will see the last of that fraudulent demand.

74. One cannot, indeed, escape the overwhelming impression that there have been consistent, deliberate and increasing attempts on the part of international capitalism to frustrate and impede progress towards Namibia's independence for as long as possible. The centre-piece of this scheme has been *apartheid* South Africa's acts of aggression against and destabilization of neighbouring countries in the region. Yet the international mass media, controlled by the multinationals that are busily exploiting the wealth of Namibia, would have us believe that South Africa is a paragon of sweet reasonableness, willing to reach an agreement in the Namibian negotiations. The evidence, however, is that negotiations over Namibia have been scuttled each time they have been on the point of agreement by South Africa's introduction of extraneous and irrelevant issues that have nothing to do with Council resolution 435 (1978). South Africa has equally consistently received support in its dilatory tactics from the very countries that have vested economic interests in Namibia.

75. In fact, so enthusiastic and consistent has been that support that many countries wonder how we came to elect the five North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries, which have significant economic interests in Namibia and South Africa, to serve as honest brokers in these important negotiations. It is therefore obvious that the delaying tactics adopted by South Africa and its supporters have the more sinister purpose of creating a smoke-screen for the continued control of Namibia by the *apartheid* régime through its attempts to establish fresh internal constitutional arrangements for the Territory.

76. Meanwhile, under cover of that same smoke-screen, the rape of Namibia, the ruthless exploitation of the mineral wealth of that hapless Territory, continues unabated and at an accelerated pace. Indeed, it looks as if South Africa and its allies are determined to bleed Namibia dry and take every ounce of its wealth before they consent to hand over the Territory to its rightful and legitimate inhabitants, if they ever do so. Since such activities are clearly in violation of the letter and spirit of the decrees of the United Nations Council for Namibia, my Government wishes to re-emphasize that those involved in the shameless exploitation of Namibia will have to accept the penalties for such anti-Namibian activities at the appropriate time.

77. Five years of prevarication and delay with regard to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia is long enough, and we could not agree more with the Secretary-General's conclusion in his latest report on the Territory [*S/15776*] that the independence of Namibia is the essential and primary issue which we must now face up to without further delay. In this connection, the Government of Ghana wishes to reaffirm its total support for the Paris Declaration on Namibia adopted at the International Conference last month.[3]

78. We wish also to express our support for resolution 532 (1983), which has just been adopted by the Council, because it articulates the international community's dissatisfaction with the present impasse in the negotiations on Namibia's independence. Furthermore, we see this resolution as the Council's first step towards ensuring the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

79. We wish for our part to reiterate our commitment to the full implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without any deviation or dilution, and we hope that the momentum just regenerated by the Council by the adoption of resolution 532 (1983) can be sustained with a view to establishing UNTAG in Namibia this autumn.

80. Ghana is totally opposed to any attempts now or in the future to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola is a matter for the Cuban and Angolan Governments alone to decide in the exercise of their sovereign rights. We trust that the absence of this demand in the Council's resolution to which I have just referred has disposed of the matter once and for all.

81. I should like to conclude my remarks by reaffirming Ghana's continued commitment to and support for the Namibian people's struggle, under the leadership of SWAPO, for the total liberation and independence of their motherland. We shall continue to support the people of Namibia in every way possible through the OAU and

the United Nations to bring freedom and independence to the Territory.

82. We wish in particular to place on record our appreciation of the tireless efforts of the Secretary-General in his search for a peaceful solution to the Namibia independence dispute and to urge the Council to give him its fullest and most immediate support in the fresh start we have just made in bringing Namibia rapidly to freedom and independence in strict accordance with Council resolution 435 (1978) and other relevant resolutions of the United Nations. My Government is ready to give the Secretary-General any assistance within our means to enable him to carry out the onerous duties now entrusted to him in translating resolution 435 (1978) into reality.

83. Ghana remains committed to the total liberation of the African continent and to the maintenance of world peace and security. Therefore, it cannot and will not shirk its responsibility towards the people of Namibia. We hope that the Council also will continue to shoulder its responsibility in the matter.

84. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Johnstone F. Makatini, representative of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), to whom the Council extended an invitation at its 2447th meeting. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

85. Mr. MAKATINI: Mr. President, I thank you most sincerely for giving me the opportunity to express, on behalf of the oppressed and struggling people of South Africa, the views and position of ANC on the burning issue before the Council. Our thanks also go to all the other members of the Council for making this possible.

86. Your country's and your own personal commitment to the struggle for the total liberation of the African continent is well known, Sir. It is therefore with a deep sense of satisfaction that we see you presiding over the deliberations of the Council when it is discussing the Namibian problem.

87. The ANC delegation wishes to pay a well-deserved tribute to the States members of both the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement for their initiative in having so many Ministers for Foreign Affairs come to New York to express their common concern with clarity and firmness at this crucial period in the struggle of the Namibian people.

88. Since this is the first time we have appeared before the Council this year and this month, I should like first of all to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council during the month of June, and the representatives of Malta, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Zimbabwe, the new members of the Council. That all their Governments and they themselves fully share the paramount objective of ANC of a non-racial, democratic society for all the South African people, regardless of race, colour or creed, is a source of strength to our movement and our noble cause.

89. We must not fail to express our appreciation to the representatives they have replaced. Their teamwork with all the other countries that are equally committed to the African liberation cause helped us to reach important political milestones.

90. May I also be excused for singling out the delegation of Zimbabwe so as to salute, even in his absence, a dear friend and comrade-in-arms, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is not simply because we feel singularly inspired and encouraged at seeing former fellow freedom fighters—with whom we shared the so-called terrorist label that rightfully belonged to Ian Smith—now seated as representatives in the Council. I salute you, Mr. President, and your Minister for Foreign Affairs and express the admiration of ANC for the able manner in which your Government and Comrade Robert Mugabe continue successfully to detect and defuse the numerous time-bombs deliberately set by the erstwhile Pretoria-Salisbury axis and its partners in the anti-African alliances.

91. The exhaustive catalogue of betrayals of the Namibian people's just and heroic struggle so eloquently cited by several Ministers for Foreign Affairs and many representatives of non-aligned and other countries committed to the African liberation cause revealed the continuing conspiracy not only to delay but also to derail the progress towards genuine independence of Namibia.

92. We shall refrain from repeating what has been so effectively stated to demonstrate the endless maze of double-talk, prevarications and other impediments designed to delay and prevent the independence of Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO, the sole authentic and far-sighted representative of the Namibian people.

93. I should like at this juncture to pay a glowing tribute to the brother people of Namibia, our comrade-in-arms, SWAPO, and the People's Liberation Army of Namibia for the outstanding heroism, perseverance and fortitude that they have displayed not only in shattering racist South Africa's much-vaunted military might but also in facing up to the endless conspiracies. The task of Comrade Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, has not been an easy one.

94. The hopes raised by the emergence in 1978 of the Western contact group have been dashed to the ground by its refusal to exert the promised collective diplomatic and economic leverage on the intransigent racist régime.

95. However, it would not be proper or fair to say that the present state of affairs fully vindicates the fears that were entertained by some silent but doubting Thomases who strongly questioned the intentions of the contact group, comprising as it does countries that have earned international notoriety for the collaboration they continue to enjoy with the illegal occuper of Namibia.

96. In their favour it can be argued that they succeeded in bringing the Pretoria régime, albeit screaming and kicking, to the negotiating table at the pre-implementation meeting at Geneva in January 1981. The fact that these were countries that throughout had pursued a policy of duplicity, if not of outright support for the *apartheid* régime, raised sharp questions and doubts.

97. Even though mindful of the fact that this initiative could have been motivated by the contact group's attempt to delay the struggle with a view to imposing a fictitious neo-colonialist solution, the self-confidence, maturity and good faith of SWAPO and the front-line States were proved by their co-operation and agreement to make concessions.

98. The co-operation and readiness of SWAPO to facilitate the settlement were demonstrated unequivocally when Comrade Sam Nujoma stood up at the Geneva meeting and declared his readiness to sign a cease-fire and agree to the immediate implementation of the United Nations plan. It will be recalled that the so-called South African Administrator-General announced on 13 January 1981—a week before the inauguration of the new United Nations Administration—that South Africa was not prepared to proceed with implementing the United Nations plan. Torpedoed by the *apartheid* régime—which was obviously jubilant over the demise of the Jimmy Carter Administration and its policy of recognizing the indigenous character of the struggle for decolonization in Namibia and a non-racial, democratic society in South Africa—the pre-implementation meeting broke up.

99. What followed those developments is of vital and fundamental importance for the settlement of the Namibia question, the elimination of the *apartheid* system and the solution of the problems of peace, stability and security in southern Africa. It is vital to the Council, whose *raison d'être* is the settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace.

100. President Ronald Reagan's public embrace of the Pretoria régime as a friend and ally elicited surprise, consternation and shock, embarrassed the American people, friends and allies, angered the African people, and caused jubilation in Pretoria. He went further by assuring that régime that the United States would not leave it in the lurch, that the Administration would pursue a policy of constructive engagement aimed at removing the polecat status imposed on the racist régime by the international community and would set a pre-condition linking the withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist forces with Namibia's independence; that the Administration would reward the African countries that befriended the régime and punish and even topple those that assisted ANC and SWAPO; and that the settlement of the Namibian question must take into account the South African régime's "legitimate security concerns".

101. Those and several other statements of solidarity with the self-confessed Nazi supporters, whose system of *apartheid* stands universally condemned as a crime against humanity and a threat to world peace, led to the unholy alliance that continues to grow. That alliance has been further strengthened by secret visits by the régime's military intelligence officials, the training of racist South Africa's coast guards in the United States, the visit to South Africa by William Casey, Chief of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, for discussions on the problem of Namibia and *apartheid*, and constant attacks against ANC and SWAPO as terrorist organizations.

102. There could have been no greater solidarity for a régime which for decades has been an international pariah. This encouraged and emboldened the régime to show greater intransigence, practise more brutal repression inside South Africa, step up assassinations of ANC leaders in the country and the neighbouring States, undertake more brazen acts of destabilization and aggression against the front-line, Indian Ocean and neighbouring countries. We have no doubt that the United Nations plan has been the biggest casualty of the Washington-Pretoria axis.

103. As a direct consequence of the United States giving comfort and succour to its strategic ally, the *apartheid* régime, we find that the present South African representative can make the outrageous claim that its presence in Namibia is legal.

104. In a statement before the Council the other day, the Pretoria régime's representative declared:

> "The time has come to remind the United Nations that South Africa has never accepted the United Nations view that South Africa's presence in the Territory is illegal; nor has the International Court of Justice ever delivered a binding judgement to the effect that South Africa's right to administer the Territory has been terminated. As far as South Africa is concerned, it continues to administer the Territory legally and in conformity with the spirit of the lapsed Mandate from the League of Nations." [*2440th meeting, para. 71.*]

This defiant, categorical and unequivocal statement goes to the root of the whole problem and flatly negates the oft-repeated assurances by the contact group that the negotiations have reached a crucial stage and the independence of Namibia is around the corner.

105. In his statement before the Council at its 2439th meeting, Comrade Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, helpfully reminded us of the ruling given on 21 June 1971 by the International Court of Justice, in paragraph 133 of its advisory opinion, where it states that:

> "the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory".[1]

106. In the light of its position in the negotiation process for the independence of Namibia, it is abundantly

clear that the role of the United States cannot be considered that of an honest broker.

107. That the Namibian people, SWAPO, the front-line States and the United Nations have been deceived is self-evident. The question before us is whether the South African régime has been deceiving the contact group as well, or whether the régime undertook this deceptive exercise jointly with, and with the conscious collusion of, the contact group. This question must be answered by the contact group in the interest of its own credibility, not just in words but through action. If the contact group has been deceived by the *apartheid* régime we believe that, in defence of their compromised moral integrity, its members must now take the lead in calling for the imposition of sanctions against the South African régime.

108. In his closing remarks, Comrade Sam Nujoma repeated:

> ". . . unless this august body acts decisively to secure the withdrawal of South Africa from the international Territory of Namibia, we shall have no alternative but to continue the armed struggle with greater intensity". [*See 2439th meeting, para. 153.*]

This statement is a serious indictment of the international community in general and the contact group in particular.

109. For our part, we seize this opportunity to reaffirm our revolutionary solidarity with our comrades-in-arms, of SWAPO, the sole authentic representative of the people of Namibia. We pay a glowing tribute to its armed combatants, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia, and assure them that, now that the situation is ripe inside South Africa and ANC has joined them in the trenches, we shall fight side by side until final victory.

110. The Pretoria régime's illegal rule does not begin and end in Namibia. In South Africa itself, as a product of colonial conquest, the régime keeps the 23 million blacks under subjugation at the point of the gun and governs without the consent of the governed.

111. We raise this point because a few days ago there a lot was said and written about the situation in South Africa. On 23 May, South African war planes attacked Mozambique, bombing civilian targets, including private houses, a factory and a crèche, killing five adults and a child. This was boastfully reported by the *apartheid* régime as an act of retaliation for what took place in Pretoria on 20 May when the armed combatants of the Umkhonto we Sizwe MK attacked the South African Air Force headquarters.

112. We should like to make it quite clear that the alleged ANC bases that were supposedly attacked in Mozambique do not exist. This is well known to the South African régime thanks to its intelligence service. We should also like to make it clear that, contrary to the claims made by the régime, not only does ANC have no bases in Mozambique, but this is the case in all the neighbouring countries. And this point has been repeatedly stated by the régime's own Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, who has said, according to the South African newspapers, that ANC is not waging an area war but a psychological war.

113. It is clear that the South African régime, unable to contain the rising tide of resistance in South Africa, has resorted to using the front-line States and Lesotho as scapegoats in order to placate the panic-stricken white constituents who are beginning to wonder if the régime is capable of defending them should ANC respond in kind and do what the régime has been doing since the advent of settler colonialism in South Africa.

114. The institutionalized racism, exploitation and plunder, bolstered by the legislative mechanism of the exclusively white Parliament, judiciary and provincial councils, are justified by South Africa on the basis of the white supremacy doctrine preached from the pulpit and taught in the classroom. Its agents are covered with the blood of innocent blacks, killed in prison, assassinated by hit squads inside the country or in neighbouring States, or massacred at Sharpeville, Soweto, Langa, Maseru or Matola. The régime's hangman is the busiest in the world, since that régime holds the world record for hangings.

115. The 23 million Africans are not only denied the right to vote by this régime, considered in some circles in the West as a member of the so-called free world, but are today being made foreigners in the land of their birth. They are daily being uprooted in their millions and herded off to the vast concentration camps for displaced persons in the bantustans—the so-called national independent States—where they either starve and die or sell their labour cheap in the urban areas where they can remain legally only for so long as they minister to the needs of the whites. Since 1976, a total of 8 million people have been forcibly removed and have lost their citizenship in South Africa.

116. These disabilities and a million others, including the expropriation of land, have been the lot of the blacks in South Africa since the advent of settler colonialism, when, after almost 200 years of fighting, our people's resistance was subdued, thanks to the superiority of the gun to the spear. Two years after the formation of the so-called Union of South Africa, ANC was formed in 1912. The 50 years of non-violent methods of struggle achieved little other than total dispossession, disenfranchisement and super-exploitation.

117. The heightened militancy and spirit of protests, which coincided with the wind of change in other parts of Africa, resulted in the increase of mass arrests, banishments, hangings and massacres, climaxed by the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in South Africa. The Soweto, Gogolito, Langa and Sharpeville massacres, and many others, resulted in the wanton murder of innocent black men, women and children, gunned down by racist police using Western weapons and carrying out their masters' standing orders to "shoot first and ask questions later".

118. It will be recalled that even after the Sharpeville massacre, ANC and its sister organizations, concerned over the then imminent proclamation of a Fascist Republic following the régime's world-wide condemnation and forced withdrawal from the Commonwealth, called for a national convention to discuss the future of the country. The letters addressed to the racist Prime Minister of the day by Nelson Mandela, acting on behalf of the already outlawed ANC, were not even accorded the courtesy of acknowledgement. Thus the last attempt by ANC to keep open the avenues for dialogue met with failure.

119. The last straw was the régime's use of its entire police force and army to crush a national strike, called by Nelson Mandela in the name of ANC in order to protest against the Fascist Republic. Yesterday's celebration of the proclamation was made less festive by the crisis of confidence which has hit the white community.

120. It was amid armed attacks against installations connected with the policy of *apartheid*, that Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)—the spear of the nation—announced its formation on 16 December 1961 through its manifesto:

> "The Government policy of force, repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violence only. The choice is not ours. It has been made by the Nationalist Government which has rejected every peaceful demand by our people for rights and freedom and answered every such demand with force and yet more force. We of MK have always sought—as the liberation movement has sought—to achieve liberation without bloodshed and civil clash. We do so still. We hope, even at this late hour, that our first actions will awaken everyone to the realization of the disastrous situation to which the Nationalist policy is leading."

121. This situation and the historic decision taken by ANC in 1961 and continuing to this day is not unique. A large number of States, including Zimbabwe and the United States, were at some stage of their people's struggle for emancipation from colonial, alien or dictatorial régimes, forced to take the same position. A good number of States Members of the United Nations, including members of the Security Council, fall into this category. Indeed, it includes the United States, whose Declaration of Independence states that:

> "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government . . . organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness. . . . But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."

122. The rapidly deteriorating situation in southern Africa has been further aggravated by the régime's continued destabilization of Lesotho. Three days ago, following a bomb blast in Bloemfontein, carried out by one of the agents of the régime, later followed by an announcement from Maseru addressed to the South African Broadcasting Corporation, purporting to come from ANC and claiming responsibility for the bomb attack in Bloemfontein, the border with Lesotho was closed, causing the prevention of the passage of supplies of essential goods such as foodstuffs, medical supplies and petrol. This showed clearly that this attempt by the régime to discredit ANC was intended also to prepare the ground for stepping up the destabilization of Lesotho, if not the overthrowing of its legitimate Government and the replacing of it by South Africa's puppet, the leader of a counter-revolutionary group which is armed, equipped, financed and deployed by the South African régime.

123. We close by appealing to Member States to give this problem immediate attention, for Lesotho is the victim of aggression because it stands firm on the implementation of United Nations resolutions.

124. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Clovis Maksoud, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, to whom the Council extended an invitation at its 2443rd meeting. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

125. Mr. MAKSOUD: Mr. President, I should like to express to you, and through you to the Council, the appreciation of the League of Arab States for the opportunity to make a statement here, in which we should like to reaffirm our traditional and continued support for the struggle of the people of Namibia, for the representative of the Namibian people, SWAPO, and for the President of SWAPO, who has addressed the Council.

126. I should like to take this opportunity to express to you, Sir, both in your personal capacity and as the representative of your great, struggling country, Zimbabwe, our warm friendship and solidarity with your people, whose struggle has given inspiration to the peoples of Africa and the Arab world in their efforts to achieve their liberation objectives.

127. In the last few days we have witnessed an array of statesmen, Ministers for Foreign Affairs, ambassadors and representatives of liberation struggles addressing the Council in a debate that resulted in Council resolution 532 (1983), which seeks to revitalize the commitment of the international community to the anchorage that the United Nations represents for the peoples of Africa and of the world.

128. During the debate we have all heard the details of the various aspects of the policy of *apartheid*, and the

techniques used to avoid the implementation of United Nations resolutions. We have seen how the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, believing as it does in institutionalizing *apartheid* and racism and manifesting its exclusionary racial policy, seeks to circumvent the will of the international community and the rights of the people of Namibia and southern Africa and to buy time and procrastinate with regard to the implementation of the various Council resolutions, more particularly resolution 435 (1978).

129. The struggle of the people of Namibia is well known. The League of Arab States and the Arab people support unequivocally the struggle to expedite the achievement of independence by the people of Namibia. The Arab nation as a whole realizes that what has taken place in the southern part of Africa is part of their own national struggle.

130. Nine member Arab countries belong to the OAU, our sister organization, and we share not only the problems of Namibia but problems throughout the third world, with which we share not only a common commitment but a common destiny. Therefore, in the struggle that SWAPO, ANC and the other liberation movements have undertaken, they have committed themselves to having recourse to the United Nations and to exploring all political options in order to ensure the pre-eminence of non-violence as a technique of struggle. Yet, when their rights have been consistently violated, violence has been systematically imposed. Violence is inherent in the colonial *apartheid* plan.

131. Much of the Western media and some Western countries have sought to focus on the reaction to violence and have claimed that it is a form of terrorism. This is a technique that was applied to the struggle of your country, Mr. President. This is a technique that has been applied to the struggle of the Namibian people. This is a technique that is applied today to the struggle of the Palestinian people.

132. It is a technique whereby *apartheid*—or Zionism, for that matter, or any form of settler colonialism—seeks to arrogate to itself a God-given right to exclude people from enjoying equality, to deprive them of their freedom, dignity and independence, and to do so without being challenged. Therefore, any form of challenge to racism, *apartheid* or settler colonialism is considered to be a challenge to law and order or a challenge to stability. Some in their arrogance have even gone so far as to say that it is a challenge to the so-called free world.

133. It was magnificent to see and hear the large number of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and statesmen from throughout the non-aligned countries and the African world who came here to bear witness to the need to provide the Council with the moral impetus to retrieve its own credibility and effectiveness. It was necessary to focus on the fact that the moral priority in the world community today is to guarantee the right to freedom and independence of the people of Namibia and all peoples throughout the world; and on the fact that all attempts to dilute this right, whether by introducing extraneous reasons, or linkages, or talk of "reasonable negotiating positions" are aimed at facing the Council and the struggling people of Namibia with an impossible option.

134. This impossible option is as follows: if the Security Council adopts resolutions whereby it assumes total responsibility under the Charter for world peace and order and international security and plays the role of deterring the aggressor and the violator of the legal, national and human rights of the people of Namibia by resorting to sanctions, it will not be possible to implement these resolutions. So the world community is cautioned in its deliberations that the resolutions it adopts should not reach their logical conclusion, that the United Nations should not assume its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations lest the assumption of responsibility for deterring the aggressor and violator and for setting in motion the corrective process in those areas should become a further excuse for South Africa—or, as in earlier cases, for Israel—to avoid compliance with United Nations resolutions, particularly Council resolutions. It is this technique of lessening the impact of the Council and of the United Nations as a whole that has led to disaffection, in many instances, on the part of the peoples of the world who have looked forward to the Council's process of policy-making, that is, not only setting policies but also implementing them.

135. The need is not so much for Council resolutions, although we welcome the latest resolution. The need is for an apparatus which sets in motion the implementation of these resolutions. The need is to restore the effectiveness of this body, the confidence of the world community and the credibility of these resolutions, and, if I may say so, in the light of the Charter and the expectations of mankind, the sanctity of these resolutions.

136. We say so because we in the Arab States—especially in the month of June last year, when Lebanon, my own country, was invaded by Israel—have often come to the Council pleading, sometimes begging, for justice with regard to limited objectives. We all remember how often, during the raid on and the siege of Beirut, the Council pleaded for the release of water supplies for the people of Beirut. In the same way, resolutions were unanimously adopted here. All the members know resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), although they may not necessarily remember them vividly. Has Council resolution 435 (1978) suffered the same fate as Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982)?

137. Let it be said that the unanimous adoption of resolution 532 (1983) despite the various interpretations and circumstances, was intended to reinforce the mechanism of implementation and as an opportunity for implementing resolution 435 (1978). Otherwise we should find countries—super-Powers—voting for resolutions and then behaving in a manner that circumvents them. We should, as it were, be depriving the resolutions of their substance, of their meaning. Then there might be a time when the people of Namibia, the people of Africa, the

people of Palestine, of Lebanon and of the whole Arab nation would say: "Why do we have recourse to the Security Council when its resolutions cannot be implemented?"

138. There is, of course, an attempt by the two remaining colonial settlements in the third world, those of Israel and South Africa, to make all the peoples of the world, in their commitment to the United Nations, realize the helplessness of the Organization and the hopelessness of our peoples as regards achieving their legitimate, internationally recognized and inalienable rights to freedom and independence through recourse to and the exhaustion of diplomatic and political means. Both South Africa and Israel believe that their anachronistic, medieval ideologies, backed by the most modern military and nuclear equipment, can confound the world's conscience and consensus and restore to their own régimes and systems the ability to continue making Security Council resolutions totally irrelevant to conditions on the ground, whether in southern Lebanon, on the West Bank or in Namibia and southern Africa.

139. We wish to make an appeal on behalf of the League of Arab States, and I am sure that this appeal is shared by our sister organizations and their member States, as was manifested by the resolution of the non-aligned countries and that of the OAU. We appeal to the States of the contact group, in their approach to the problems of South Africa, not to consider our betting on their initiative and on their contacts as a way of becoming hostage to that group. The same applies to what is taking place in the Middle East: betting on United States initiatives is fundamentally distinct from becoming hostage to its unilateral crisis management.

140. The contact group of Western countries must realize that the confidence that might have been placed in their ability to defuse the critical nature of the situation and lessen the possibility of confrontation is not a green light for them to help, directly or indirectly, in subverting the legitimate national rights and aspirations of the people of Namibia.

141. The many similarities that exist between what is taking place in the Israeli-Arab conflict and what is taking place in the conflict between the African people, in particular the Namibian people, and the *apartheid* régime of South Africa, make it necessary for the League of Arab States and OAU to cross-fertilize by means of their respective experience in order to expedite their respective freedom struggles.

142. The PRESIDENT: The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*, p. 16.

[2] See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 24*, vol. I, annex II.

[3] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983*, (A/CONF. 120/13), part three.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

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UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2452nd MEETING: 7 JUNE 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

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2452nd MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 7 June 1983, at 5.10 p.m.

President: Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2452)

1. Adoption of the agenda;

2. The question of South Africa:
   Letter dated 6 June 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15814).

The meeting was called to order at 5.15 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The question of South Africa:

Letter dated 6 June 1983 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15814)

1. The PRESIDENT: This meeting of the Council has been convened in accordance with the request made by the representative of Morocco as Chairman of the Group of African States.

2. Members of the Council have before them document S/15815, which contains the text of a draft resolution worked out in the course of consultations of the Council. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution. If I hear no objection, I shall put it to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously (resolution 533 (1983)).

3. The PRESIDENT: The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.

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UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2453rd MEETING: 15 JUNE 1983

NEW YORK

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2453rd MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 15 June 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2453)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/158/15812 and Add.1)

The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15812 and Add.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Security Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Canada, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Pelletier (Canada) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to recall that in the course of the Council's consultations members of the Council agreed that an invitation should be extended to Mr. Nail Atalay in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to invite Mr. Atalay in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 December 1982 to 31 May 1983 [*S/15812 and Add.1*]. Members also have before them a draft resolution [*S/15828*], which has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 534 (1983)].

4. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Cyprus, upon whom I now call.

5. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the high office of President of the Security Council, a development which reflects a deserved honour to your country, and to express my appreciation to you for the skilful manner in which you have conducted the proceedings of the Council on the draft resolution for the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another period of six months. It is a source of great satisfaction for our Government and our people that the presidency of this important organ of the United Nations is in the talented hands of a distinguished representative of a very friendly country with which we share excellent relations.

6. Our congratulations go also to the President of the Security Council for the month of May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Zaire, Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, and the representative of Zaire, Mr. Umba di Lutete, for the impeccable manner in which they conducted the Council's deliberations on a number of issues, including the question of Namibia.

7. I should like to thank the members of the Council for giving me the opportunity to address them and express my Government's appreciation for the renewal of the

mandate which is essential to the peace-keeping process with regard to Cyprus.

8. I have been directed by my Government to reiterate assurances of full and constructive co-operation with the Secretary-General and to express to him deep appreciation for his untiring efforts for a just solution of the problem of Cyprus and for his dedication to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. As I recently stated before the Council on the question of Namibia [*2451st meeting*], the Secretary-General in these turbulent times is being increasingly called upon to take active roles in various parts of the world. This is a tribute to his excellent personal and diplomatic qualities and evidence of the high confidence and trust placed in him by the international community.

9. I should also like to commend the significant contribution made by the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Urquhart, and by his colleagues in the Secretariat and to express our warm appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, whom I welcome here, and his assistants for the dedicated and efficient manner in which they carry out their mission in Cyprus.

10. My Government's appreciation goes also to the Commander of UNFICYP, Major-General G. Greindl, whom I also welcome here, and to his officers and men for the dedicated manner in which they have performed the duties which the Council has entrusted to them. Our warm feelings of gratitude and appreciation go also to the friendly Governments which, through voluntary contributions of personnel and funds, made it possible for UNFICYP to continue rendering its valuable assistance to peace-keeping in Cyprus.

11. The Security Council meetings on the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP are of necessity occasions for examining the tragic situation prevailing in my country, a non-aligned State Member of the United Nations, situated in the strategic and volatile eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus, whose destiny is to be a bridge of co-operation and understanding between the three continents that surround it, is today going through one of the most critical periods of its long history, with 37 per cent of its territory under Turkish occupation, almost 200,000 of its people uprooted from their ancestral homes and lands and with hundreds missing since the Turkish invasion of July-August 1974. These Council meetings constitute also a sad reminder that United Nations resolutions—especially General Assembly resolution 3212 (XXIX), adopted unanimously and later endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365 (1974)—are as far from being implemented as ever, and that as a result the problem of Cyprus continues to pose a grave threat to the peace of the region and to international peace and security in general.

12. Regrettably, not only has progress not been made during the period under consideration toward a just solution of the problem of Cyprus, but a deterioration of the situation has taken place since the last renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP on 14 December 1982, to the detriment of all our people. The continued presence of the Turkish occupation troops, contrary to repeated Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the partitionist and annexationist policies of the occupying Power and the consistent and systematic attempts to consolidate the fruits of aggression have rendered the problem more acute, and the need for a just and lasting solution even more pressing.

13. The Council is faced with a situation where the occupying power is flouting United Nations resolutions, clinging to the spoils of occupation, and, in defiance of world public opinion, proceeding to its goal by changing the demographic character of the invaded territory of the Republic and incorporating it politically, economically and socially into Turkey. In the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, the Government in Ankara has continued to consolidate further the new series of illegalities which it initiated last year by establishing a so-called "Central Bank"—a separatist act *per se*—by issuing "Definitive Certificates of Ownership" of the properties of the refugees to people other than the rightful owners, and by introducing as of 24 May 1983 the Turkish lira as the official tender in occupied Cyprus, the latter being a striking example of the annexationist policy of Turkey.

14. A month ago, on 13 May, the General Assembly, during its resumed thirty-seventh session, adopted resolution 37/253, on the question of Cyprus, by an overwhelming majority of 103 in favour, 5 against, with 20 abstentions.

15. This fair and balanced resolution, apart from reaffirming basic United Nations positions of principle on the question of Cyprus—namely, respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, unity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, the immediate withdrawal of the occupation forces, the return of the refugees to their ancestral homes and lands in safety and continuation of the intercommunal talks on the internal aspects of the question of Cyprus in a meaningful, result-oriented, constructive and substantive manner—contains an additional positive paragraph which welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to pursue a renewed personal involvement in the quest for a solution of the problem of Cyprus.

16. Since then, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktaş, reacting with utter disregard and outright contempt to this pronouncement of the international community, have embarked on new secessionist and partitionist steps directed against the territorial integrity and unity of my country, at the same time undermining the Secretary-General's initiative and the intercommunal talks. Furthermore, Mr. Denktaş has been arguing that the Turkish Cypriot community has the right to separate self-determination and that this development will meet with the approval of Turkey. One would expect more consistency from the Government of Turkey, a country that is represented in the United Nations Council for Namibia and that purports to be a supporter of that country's unity and territorial integrity.

17. The Turkish argument now for such secessionist positions is that internationalization of the question of Cyprus by my Government while negotiations are going on is contrary to the spirit of the intercommunal talks. Turkey forgets, however, or intends to forget that the talks are held to solve the internal aspects of the problem of Cyprus. The international aspects of the problem—namely, the invasion and occupation and the violation of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus, which have been continuing since July 1974—are matters rightly to be considered by the United Nations, which has the competence to deal with international issues affecting world peace and security.

18. Furthermore, the talks are the offspring of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. To report back to the General Assembly, the body that called for the talks, could hardly be regarded as an act inconsistent with them. On the contrary, it was an appropriate and necessary act on the part of my Government to apprise that body that called for the talks of the impediments encountered and to request its further assistance in the search for a just and lasting solution, in accordance with United Nations principles. Paragraph 16 of General Assembly resolution 37/253, which welcomes the intended initiative of the Secretary-General, is a positive and constructive outcome of the debate and as such it was universally hailed.

19. It is regrettable that the Turkish side, instead of demonstrating good will and a constructive attitude, has, after the adoption of that paragraph, refused to attend the talks and has even failed to respond to the Secretary-General's call for a meeting to discuss his intention to pursue a renewed personal involvement.

20. With such unacceptable positions being propagated by Turkey, it is no wonder that no progress has been achieved on any substantive issue on the internal aspects of the question of Cyprus, a development that is much regretted by my Government. However, so long as cardinal truths are disregarded, so long as the obvious is clouded by the mist of chauvinistic sophistries, there cannot be any progress. Even the right of human beings to know the whereabouts of their loved ones, a purely humanitarian issue completely separate from the political aspects of the problem of Cyprus, is continuously being frustrated.

21. The solution of the problem of Cyprus is not difficult if universal principles and cardinal truths are recognized and applied.

22. About 100 years ago, a State that is a permanent member of the Council went through a civil war in which millions of lives were lost. Still, the principle of "one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all" emerged strengthened. Why should Cyprus be an exception? Is there any country that has not tasted internal upheaval? Must they be split because of these sad developments?

23. In Cyprus, lofty principles and universal values are at stake. The principle of the unity of the State is challenged by the Turkish policies of division based on ethnic criteria. The upholding of these principles is of vital importance to the members of the world community at large if the peoples of the world are to enjoy freely their civil, political and human rights.

24. For our part we steadfastly hold that the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus cannot be allowed to be shattered by discredited partitionist policies. What was created as one and undivided must not be split by force of arms or outmoded partitionist policies, because division runs counter to the moral flow of the universe. To these high goals is directed the core of the peaceful endeavours of our people.

25. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has given its consent to the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP because it believes that the United Nations Force contributes to the preservation of calm and assists in the maintenance of peace, factors which have a positive effect on the intercommunal talks.

26. With regard to the talks, I have been directed by my Government to place again on record that we support the continuation of free, meaningful, constructive and result-oriented negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General. Furthermore, as Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, has stated, we welcome the intended initiative of the Secretary-General for a personal involvement in the quest for a solution, and to this end we extend the full co-operation of the Government of the Republic.

27. We hope that new, forward-looking thoughts will finally prevail on the Turkish side on the many positive elements of resolution 37/253 and that we may proceed in a constructive spirit to assist the Secretary-General in his intended initiative for a solution of this problem.

28. I wish to conclude by making an appeal to the Turkish side to abandon its present policies and to work at the negotiating table with determination and in good faith to reach speedily a just and durable solution based on relevant United Nations resolutions and high-level agreements.

29. My Government is ready for such a solution. We owe that much to the people of Cyprus as a whole. I feel that the time has come to put an end to their suffering and depravation. The people of Cyprus fervently yearn to share their future together, as they have always done for centuries. They dream and anxiously await the moment when the imposed artificial barriers of segregation—the barbed wire and the check-points—will be removed and the military outposts will be dismantled. They pray for the moment when they will be able to embrace each other again in our island, where there will be no foreign armies, no refugees and no lines of separation.

30. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Greece, on whom I now call.

31. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for acceding to my request to participate in this debate. Allow me at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June. In you we honour not only an able and experienced leader, but also the country you represent—a relatively new Member of the United Nations and one whose multi-faceted tradition guarantees a valuable contribution to the work of the Organization.

32. The perpetuation of the Cyprus problem, which has developed into a major international anomaly, has made it almost a ritual for the Security Council to hear, twice a year, on the occasion of the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP, the views of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus before it gives its consent to this renewal, as well as the views of other parties which have a concern with the developments in Cyprus. Thus, it is with regret that I have asked once again to speak on a matter so well known to Council members.

33. My Government fully concurs with the consent given by the Government of Cyprus to the renewal of the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months. We believe that the conditions prevailing in the Republic of Cyprus are still such as to justify fully the presence there of the Peace-keeping Force, which greatly contributes to the maintenance of peace in the area.

34. I shall refrain from indulging in an extensive analysis of the situation in the Republic of Cyprus. The facts were recently put forward to the Members of the United Nations once more on the occasion of the debate on the question of Cyprus held at the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly four weeks ago. At the Assembly's 116th meeting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, as the representative of Cyprus has just done here, made a thorough presentation of the realities which have unfortunately been plaguing his country without any change since the Turkish aggression in 1974 and the subsequent continuing occupation of part of the territory of the Republic by Turkish troops in flagrant violation of international law. To go through these events again would indeed be redundant. I would only be taking the Council's time without adding anything new to what everybody already knows.

35. Recognizing these realities and the dangers they harbour, the General Assembly most recently adopted by an overwhelming majority—and one representing a wide spectrum—its resolution 37/253. That resolution contains, in our view, a balanced assessment of the situation, points to the major elements of the problem and requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts towards creating conditions conducive to progress in the intercommunal talks with a view to finding a just and viable solution to this long-pending problem.

36. Furthermore, in his most recent report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General states:

> "I further suggested that time appeared to be closing the 'window of opportunity' to resolve the Cyprus problem. In an endeavour to arrest his continuing process of erosion, I have undertaken to strengthen my personal involvement within the framework of my mission of good offices." [*See S/15812, para. 61.*]

He further states: "I also wish to appeal again to all concerned to show the utmost restraint and to assist me in my efforts." [*Ibid., para. 63.*]

37. On behalf of my Government, Mr. President, I wish to assure you, and through you the Secretary-General, that Greece will spare no effort in lending the Secretary-General every possible assistance in order to facilitate the discharge of his difficult mission. It is our strong wish that the Government of Turkey will also show a constructive attitude in order to help him in his endeavours.

38. I have stressed our wish that Turkey would cooperate in the search for a solution because the continued personal involvement of the Secretary-General could perhaps offer a chance for an answer to the problem. Let us take advantage of this opportunity. Indeed, it is high time that an all-out effort were exerted in the direction of a solution. The world can no longer tolerate inertia. It demands a quick restoration of legality and subsequent normalcy in the Republic of Cyprus.

39. In conclusion, I should like to express our appreciation and gratitude to Major-General Greindl and the officers and men of UNFICYP for the efficiency and dedication with which they are discharging the important mission entrusted to Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which are contributing contingents, as well as to those Governments which are helping with financial contributions. It would be an omission if I did not mention in this context the untiring and dynamic activity of Mr. Gobbi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative in the island. Last but not least I should like to reiterate once more my Government's high esteem for and trust in the Secretary-General.

40. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is Mr. Nail Atalay, to whom the Council has extended an invitation in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

41. Mr. ATALAY: I thank you, Mr. President, and through you the other members of the Council for having given me this opportunity to participate in the debate on behalf of the Turkish people of Cyprus, who, although they were partners in and co-founders of the Republic of Cyprus, have been the object of attacks by the Greek Cypriots ever since 1963. The destruction has continued to this very day, and the co-founder partner community of the island—the Turkish Cypriot com-

munity—has had to seize every opportunity to make its case known to the highest body of this world assembly.

42. I cannot promise to be brief, but this is not because of a lack of respect or because of a lack of awareness of the long and frustrating hours that have been spent trying to bring about an agreement; quite the contrary. I do feel, however, that the Turkish Cypriot cause needs to be presented with all reasonable vigour and clarity so that events from this time forward will not be considered the responsibility of the Turkish Cypriot community, which has throughout its life and its struggle in Cyprus done nothing but react to what the Greek Cypriots have tried to do to Cyprus.

43. There is no Government of Cyprus. There has been none since 21 December 1963, when the legitimate Government ceased to exist after the Greek Cypriots attacked us and expelled the Turkish Cypriot representation from the ruling body and rejected the Turkish Cypriot community as co-founder partner community. This state of affairs continues to this very day. That is why I say before this Council, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, that there is no Cyprus Government.

44. If there is a Cyprus problem today, it is because there is no government by consent of the two communities in Cyprus.

45. A quarter of the population of the island is under another jurisdiction, one that is not that of the Greek Cypriot administration. Yet the latter calls itself the Government of Cyprus without being in any way a binational Government as envisaged by the 1960 Constitution and the international agreements. The Greek section of this Government did arm itself and, according to plan, did launch an attack on the Turkish Cypriot people with a view to turning Cyprus into a Greek island. Twenty years later, after all the trials and tribulations endured in Cyprus, we have heard them address the General Assembly, then the Assembly's Special Political Committee and now the Security Council for and on behalf of Cyprus, trying to speak also for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. My mere presence here speaking in the Council is indisputably the clearest demonstration of the fact that they do not represent, nor do they speak on behalf of, the Turkish Cypriots.

46. The Charter of the United Nations stands for democracy, for government under the rule of law and for government with the sanction of those governed. It stands for human rights and for the sanctity of international treaties. All those concepts were utterly trampled underfoot in 1963 by Greek Cypriot armed elements, under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios and directly armed by Greece, attempting to destroy the Turkish Cypriot people and the independence of Cyprus.

47. Since then, the Turkish Cypriot people has ruled itself, in defiance of the hostile Greek Cypriot administration, establishing its own jurisdiction in those areas where it had not been eliminated. It has lived cut off from all the privileges of statehood—cut off from all the rights to which human beings are entitled. It has defied this hostile administration because it deemed it its duty to do so.

48. The facts of this recent past are recorded in newspaper archives and in earlier reports of the Secretary-General, and they are there for all to see. But they are still vividly apparent to anyone visiting Cyprus. There the past is recorded in every Turkish Cypriot household, which still mourns a dead father, or child, or aged grandparent—pathetic victims of the Greek Cypriot grim determination to unite the island with Greece. The past is recorded in the mass graves of Aloa, Maratha and Sandallari, where 16-day-old infants are buried in the arms of their mothers, grandmothers and grandfathers, where elementary schools are shut because the entire elementary school population was lined up and ruthlessly shot and then buried in crude communal graves.

49. The whole world knows the facts. Should the Turkish Cypriots really bring newspaper clippings to remind the world of these events and can the Greeks seriously allege that the Turkish Cypriots are responsible for what has befallen them during the last 20 years?

50. The Turkish Cypriot must be convinced that those on the other side of the bench are people who really have undergone a change of heart, who truly seek peace and who are not bent on furthering their policy of unilaterally dominating Cyprus by all means, fair and foul.

51. We have tried to alert the Members of the United Nations to the fact that the title of "Government of Cyprus" was being used as a tool of aggression against a quarter of the population of Cyprus and that, if a resolution along the lines desired by the Greek Cypriots emerged from the General Assembly, then further intercommunal negotiations for the solution of the problem of Cyprus would thereby be hampered rather than helped.

52. Our prediction came true. The General Assembly adopted a one-sided resolution, which the Greek and Greek Cypriot side immediately used to avoid negotiations and to poison the climate in which negotiations were to have taken place. They immediately boasted of the number of votes obtained, claimed that the General Assembly was with them and counted the resolutions of the non-aligned countries as favouring the Greeks. All this was a futile attempt to change the past. Those were one-sided resolutions and they cannot change the past.

53. As the Greek philosopher Aristotle said, "Even the gods cannot change the past". It is a fact; no one can change the past.

54. We have here a binational country where one of the national communities—the Greek Cypriot community—has tried to destroy the other—the Turkish Cypriot community—and where this victimized party finds itself barred from all assemblies, all commissions and all conferences. Indeed, this situation can be likened to a football match, where the Greek Cypriot team is free to score against an opposing team whose goalkeeper

is bound hand and foot; and then they would have the world believe that they are playing a fair game on terms of equality and that they are the winners.

55. They have to convince us that they are our partners and that they are willing to play the game with us, not to score points in the international field but to bring peace to Cyprus. Indeed, scoring points through propaganda, deceit, untruths and misstatements of facts cannot and will not bring about a lasting reconciliation of the two peoples of Cyprus. Without reconciliation, there can be no peace in Cyprus.

56. Whenever the Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders speak, they use the terms "justice" and "injustice". How unfortunate that in Cyprus these terms have different meanings for the Turks and for the Greeks. "Justice" for the Greeks means the Greek colonization of Cyprus and Greek domination in Cyprus, leaving the Turkish Cypriots without any guarantees or defence, to live at their mercy as hostages in what they call "pre-aggression conditions", meaning those that prevailed before 1974, when the Turkish Cypriots lived from hand to mouth not knowing what the next day would bring.

57. The Turkish Cypriot community has been waiting for justice for 20 years—waiting for the re-establishment of a binational Cyprus, where the security of the Turkish Cypriots would no longer be threatened, where the Greek Cypriots would no longer use us as hostages or blackmail Turkey by saying that, if it dared to come to save the threatened Turks, it would find no Turks to save in Cyprus.

58. The Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders want the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Who does not? Where would this world be if United Nations resolutions were not translated into reality by all those who are affected by them? But those who, by manoeuvre and propaganda, have brought about the adoption of one-sided resolutions which, if implemented, would mean the destruction of the innocent, the destruction of a binational country and even the destruction of independence have no right to claim that such resolutions should be implemented, because their implementation would spell the doom of every principle the Charter of the United Nations was meant to protect and to foster.

59. We constantly witness attempts at dividing the issue into the internal aspect of the problem, that is, the constitutional and territorial issue, and the external aspect, namely, the question of aggression and foreign interference.

60. Is it interference when, under an international treaty and under the legitimate principle of self-defence, one of the Guarantor Powers risks everything in order to honour that treaty for the purpose of saving one of the two communities that brought about the Republic of Cyprus?

61. Let us ponder for a moment what would have happened to Cyprus and to the Turkish Cypriots if Turkey had not moved. If representatives will merely ask themselves that question, I am sure they will see the situation in its true light. Had Turkey not moved at my community's request, the picture would have been a much broader vista of the horrors I have already mentioned: mass graves, hundreds of young people taken into the police stations for questioning and liquidation, passers-by arrested in the streets and not heard from for 20 years. Interference indeed! Stopping that kind of conduct for and on behalf of one of the communities which signed an agreement is called interference in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

62. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriots say that they have no ambitions—and this has been said many times up to today—because of the small size of the island of Cyprus. Let us be grateful for this news, because we thought that uniting Cyprus as a whole to Greece was an ambition compatible with the size of the Greek Cypriot population. Uniting Cyprus as a whole with Greece in spite of the objections of one quarter of the population, if necessary by eliminating all the Turkish Cypriots, seems to be no ambition at all.

63. I should like to refer to a statement made by the late Archbishop Makarios on 21 August 1964 in which he said:

> "My ambition is to accomplish the union of Cyprus with Greece. I will unite Cyprus integrally with Greece and then the borders of Greece will extend to the shores of North Africa."

A small country with no ambitions, of course, could do no better.

64. It would seem that we should see no wrongful or harmful ambition in the attempt by the Greek Cypriot wing of this binational Government to project itself for 20 years as the Government of Cyprus. That is not ambition. They assert that they can speak for and defend the Turkish Cypriots; that is not ambition either. A small and defenceless country, we are told, was attacked by a major Power and destroyed and it is seeking justice at the hands of the Council.

65. Smallness and strength are comparative terms. When we faced more than 30,000 fully armed Greek Cypriots helped by the Greek army from the mainland for years and years, we had to contend with massive strength—tanks and all possible weapons from all over the world. Turkey came in to stop those people destroying the Turkish Cypriot people. Turkey could not come into the country with walking-sticks. It could not match those forces without arms of its own. And now we are told that Turkey used force in upholding the independence of Cyprus.

66. I should like to quote another passage by Archbishop Makarios. He said this on 29 July 1970. I quote him because the new leader of the Greek Cypriot community, Mr. Kyprianou, has repeatedly stated that his policy and his way are the policy and the way of the Archbishop. Here is the passage:

"The hearts of the Greeks of Cyprus, of Rhodes, and of all the Dodecanese Islands have a common beat. You have achieved your aspirations, but we, beset by difficulties and frustrated by foreign meddlers, are still struggling for ours. But despite all difficulties, Cyprus will march on to Hellenism."

67. A "foreign meddler" frustrated that march on to Hellenism. The "foreign meddler" is none other than Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot community, which defended its independence, its inalienable rights and the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus, is immediately labelled the agent of Turkey, and everything is done to stop it being heard in the international arena.

68. But for that "foreign meddling", Cyprus would have been a part of Greece by now. To the Greeks that is liberty, that is justice, that is freedom—that is a beautiful thing. No one asks what this is to the Turkish community of Cyprus—and this is the problem of Cyprus.

69. Furthermore, to split the problem into an internal and an external factor—as my colleague on the other side of the table has said today—which the Greeks and some other countries have tried to do, is an attempt to prevent what they call "foreign meddlers"—meaning Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots—from arresting that march forward to Hellenism. From my nine years of experience at the United Nations and the 30 years I have spent on this issue, I can tell the members of the Council that, after 20 years, there is no change of heart in the Greek Cypriot leadership, that the votes they have contrived to obtain from the General Assembly have hardened them in their march forward to Hellenism. The architects of the Akritas Plan [*see S/12722, annex*] have not changed their vision of Cyprus. Even the threats are the same. What is more, they are desperate, because "foreign meddlers" have stopped their spurious march forward to Hellenism, because the agents of "foreign meddlers", the Turkish Cypriots, have dared defend their rights to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus and have refused to bow to brute force.

70. They do not even want us to talk about our plight from 1963 to 1974. During those years we lived, throughout Cyprus, among the Greek population and we suffered because of it. The same threat forms the basis of the Akritas Plan. We heard the same threat again from Archbishop Makarios, who said at Rizokarpaso on 26 May 1965:

"The whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece, or it will become a holocaust. The road to fulfilment of national aspirations may be full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal, *enosis*, alive or dead."

The fact that on that march to the goal Turkish Cypriots would suffer and would die was, of course, irrelevant. The Greek Cypriots do not like the fact that we objected to being killed in the name of that glorious march.

71. Now, however, such threats no longer affect us. Thanks to our redemption, thanks to the exchange of population which, in the last phases, we carried out with the help of UNFICYP, we now live in our own sector, and if the Greek Cypriots dare attack us again, they will have to suffer the consequences much more than we shall.

72. With a deep feeling of disappointment, I should like to read out to the Council a quotation from the destructive statement Mr. Karamanlis made when, two months ago, he toasted Mr. Kyprianou, as reported in the *Athens News Agency Bulletin* dated 11 April 1983:

"The Cyprus struggle, as known, was conducted, up to 1960 in common and in agreement with Makarios. And we arrived, after many painful adventures, at the independence of the island: an independence which would allow Cyprus to develop as an exemplary State in the eastern Mediterranean, without dismissing the hope of union with Greece, under certain conditions and basically under the condition of the defining by Athens and Nicosia of a parallel foreign policy."

What a lovely statement from the President of Greece.

73. It is ironic also that Mr. Karamanlis was the leader who had signed the Zurich and London Agreements,[1] which ostensibly had closed the road to *enosis* and partition. It is extremely disappointing to have it confirmed that that signature by Greece was only a ruse to get power in Cyprus for use against the Turkish Cypriot partners with a view to uniting Cyprus with Greece. In this context it is worthwhile to remember this excerpt from the joint communiqué issued on 2 February 1966—and it still exists—at the end of Archbishop Makarios' visit to Athens: "The two Governments object to any solution ruling out the island's union with Greece."

74. That is why the intercommunal talks during the 1968 to 1974 period did not result in a compromise settlement—because the Turkish side insisted then, as it insists now, that *enosis* in any form with any country should continue to be outlawed. Unfortunately, the latest Athens visit by Mr. Kyprianou underlined once again the fact that the expansionist aims of Greece continue to guide the Greek Cypriot leadership. For a better appreciation of the eulogy to *enosis*—the union of Cyprus with Greece—and the treatment of the Cyprus problem as a problem of pan-Hellenism which must continue until the final consummation, Mr. Karamanlis' statement, as it appeared in the *Athens News Agency Bulletin*, was attached to my letter distributed in Security Council document S/15717 of 21 April 1983.

75. But we hope that common sense and the experience gathered during the long years of suffering will have taught them a few lessons. I hope one lesson they have learned is that Cyprus has never been and never will be a Greek Cypriot island. It is destined to become a Cypriot island on which Greeks and Turks will live side by side and co-operate on an equal basis. The two communities will live side by side and co-operate until such time as a stage is reached when trust and confidence begin to grow. Will this be understood by the Greek

Cypriot side? I do not know, but I should like to hope it will be.

76. Now I should like to refer to the statement which Mr. Rolandis, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Greek Cypriot administration, made on 10 May, at the 116th meeting of the resumed thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. It is a typical repetition of the well-known misleading Greek Cypriot propaganda regarding the Cyprus question.

77. If, as Mr. Rolandis alleges, "the problem of Cyprus is one of the issues which tarnish the ethical infrastructure of the world", and if it is a "dark cloud in the brightness of the eastern Mediterranean", it is surely Greece and Greek Cypriots that are to blame for creating the Cyprus problem—in the first place through their age-old struggle to unite Cyprus to Greece, which goes back to the 19th century, a struggle that took a violent turn in 1955 with the activities of the undergound EOKA terrorist movement that started that year.

78. If we are to believe Greek propaganda claiming that the Cyprus problem started in 1974 with the Turkish intervention and that the problem will be solved with the withdrawal of Turkish troops and the return of all refugees to their homes—that is, by putting back the clock to pre-July 1974 conditions—then presumably there was no problem before 1974. If that is the case, what has UNFICYP been doing in Cyprus since 1964? Why have hundreds of Turks been killed and thousands of Turkish Cypriots turned into refugees since 1963, and what has EOKA been doing since 1955? After all, there were no Turkish troops in Cyprus before 1974, other than the Turkish contingent, also authorized under the 1960 treaties. Are we to assume that there was no problem before 1974, and that tragic events did not take place prior to 1974?

79. Today the world knows that the Cyprus problem did not start with the Turkish action of July 1974 and that the problem will not be solved by merely going back to the pre-1974 days. The root-causes of the problem go as far back as 1821 and 1878, to the "*Megali Idea*"—the Great Idea—of Greece and the struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece.

80. The Greek and Greek Cypriot propaganda has again today tried to project the Cyprus problem as being simply one of invasion and occupation. When one looks at the facts and events which led to Turkey's operation in 1974, it is clear that that is far from the case. Turkey exhibited remarkable restraint and patience in the face of internal pressures and a humanitarian urge to act during the preceding 11 years. It had no alternative but to intervene following the Greek and Greek Cypriot *coup* of 15 July 1974 and the assumption of the presidency by the killer Nicos Sampson. Indeed, as the late Archbishop Makarios himself pointed out in his address to the Security Council on 19 July 1974 [*1780th meeting*], it was that *coup* of 15 July, instigated and planned by the Government of Greece, that had in fact constituted an invasion which violated the independence and the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

81. Turkey's timely intervention in 1974 in exercise of its rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee[2] and of the legitimate principle of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations not only safeguarded the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, which was in danger of coming to an end through its annexation to Greece, but saved the Turkish Cypriot community, which was in grave danger of being annihilated by Greek and Greek Cypriot armed elements.

82. Turkey's operation was therefore rather a liberation of part of Cyprus for and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot co-founding partner of the Republic of Cyprus, entitled to equal rights in the matter of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. That part of Cyprus would have been completely eliminated had it not been for the Turkish intervention. By coming to Cyprus the Turkish army in fact pushed back the Greek Cypriot and Greek mainland forces of conspiracy, which had been waging a war that threatened the very existence of a binational independent Cyprus since 1963.

83. The troops of a country which is permitted and required to station personnel in the Republic of Cyprus under article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Alliance[3] cannot reasonably be considered as "foreign", nor as "an occupying force". To suggest that Turkish Cypriots might regard Turkish troops as "foreign" or, for that matter, that any Greek Cypriot should regard Greek troops as "foreign" is to be completely ignorant of the nature of the Cyprus problem. The Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution based on those Agreements contain provisions that treat Turkey and Greece as the respective motherlands of the two Cypriot communities.

84. The Turkish peace-force presence in Cyprus today aims solely at providing security to the Turkish Cypriot community, thus preventing a recurrence of the fighting between the two communities, and maintaining peace and stability, pending a definitive solution of the problem.

85. The Turkish Government has repeatedly stated officially, at the highest level, that Turkey would withdraw its forces from the island once a settlement acceptable to both communities is found, within the framework of security arrangements to be agreed upon by the parties concerned. Until then, it will be appreciated that the need for protecting the Turkish Cypriot community remains. The presence of the Turkish forces today on the island, at the request of the Turkish Cypriot community, is the only effective guarantee for safeguarding the lives and property of the Turkish Cypriots, who were the victims of relentless Greek armed attacks between 1963 and 1974, a time of virtual occupation by over 20,000 Greek mainland troops, who had landed on the island clandestinely to assist the Greek Cypriots in their *enosis* campaign.

86. How very deceptive and misleading therefore it is for Mr. Rolandis, now assuming the part of a wolf in sheep's clothing, to misrepresent Turkey's legitimate and timely intervention in Cyprus as a situation where the Greek Cypriots and Cyprus are being "devoured by

a much bigger and mightier neighbour". This can hardly deceive anyone who is at all familiar with the real causes and the history of the Cyprus problem and the events that made Turkey's intervention necessary in 1974.

87. It is also distressing to hear Mr. Rolandis allege that "life was diverted from its normal course" in 1974. He assumes that the years of strife and suffering of the Turkish Cypriots between 1963 and 1974 were the "normal course". What may be normal for Mr. Rolandis and what Mr. Kyprianou described as "those happy years" was in fact a period of intense suffering for the Turkish Cypriots, whose human rights were violated by the Greek Cypriots, as part of a deliberate policy of subjugation and domination.

88. It is regrettable that Mr. Rolandis denigrated the efforts by the Turkish Cypriots in the north, when he referred to "institutions with no constitutional or legal foundation". The Turkish Cypriot administration and the institutions lawfully created by its constitutional organs are just as legal as the Greek Cypriot administration and its institutions in southern Cyprus. It should be remembered that since the Greek Cypriots were responsible for the disruption of the constitutional order in 1963, it is their administration and their institutions that dwell under a cloud of false legality. The fact is that the Greek Cypriots usurped, or "hijacked", at the end of the 1960s, the governmental machinery of the 1960 binational partnership Republic of Cyprus, by force of arms, relying on their military superiority on the island, and such actions can scarcely claim any semblance of legality.

89. Mr. Rolandis furthermore alleges that there is a "silent majority of Turkish Cypriots" in the north who do not support the just cause of the Turkish Cypriot community, as expounded by its leaders and as presented at the intercommunal talks. He cannot be deceiving anyone but himself. We hope that he and his colleagues will not be too late in facing the fact that all Turkish Cypriots are united in their determination to live in their own homeland in peace and security. If his allegation were true, how does he account for the fact that thousands of Turkish Cypriots chose to move from the south to freedom in the north during the 1974-75 period, at considerable risk to their lives, when Greek Cypriots were doing all they could to stop the flow, before the population exchange agreement of 2 August 1975 [*see S/11789, annex*] was implemented by UNFICYP?

90. Then Mr. Rolandis claimed that their recourse to the General Assembly was "not at all aimed at disrupting the intercommunal process". It was probably because the case was such that Mr. Rolandis felt the need to give that unconvincing explanation. It is difficult to see what advantage there can be for the Greek Cypriot side to leave the negotiating table at Nicosia and bring the issue to New York for yet another futile recourse to the General Assembly. The Cyprus problem cannot be solved by one-sided resolutions in the General Assembly or elsewhere, but, as the Secretary-General has pointed out time and again, it can only be solved and settled through direct intercommunal talks between the two parties. The only explanation can be that Mr. Rolandis, Mr. Kyprianou and other Greek Cypriot leaders and Greek leaders of Greece prefer to engage in further propaganda, in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot side, in order to keep the issue of Cyprus alive as part of their "internationalization" campaign, instead of disposing of the matter in a definitive manner, before it is too late, at the negotiating table of the Nicosia intercommunal talks.

91. I should like to turn now to the issue of missing persons in Cyprus. This is a matter which the Turkish Cypriots consider as a humanitarian concern, yet the Greek Cypriots consider it as a political issue, and it is still unresolved because they wish to exploit the matter for propaganda purposes. This is what I stated on 14 December 1982, in this Chamber:

> "The only entity competent to discuss the issue of missing persons on the island is the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP), an autonomous intercommunal body. It was not established, nor is it governed by the United Nations, but stems solely from the agreement between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. Its autonomous character was acknowledged by the Secretary-General himself in a press release on 10 November 1981. Issue in Nicosia, it states that measures to facilitate the work of the Committee 'could be finalized only by the Committee, which functions autonomously'. All the attempts by the Greek side to raise the question of missing persons in forums other than the CMP violate its terms of reference and the agreement that served to create it.
>
> "Therefore, any statement on the missing persons issue anywhere but in the Committee infringes the CMP's competence and is therefore totally unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot community.
>
> "Available evidence on the so-called missing Greek Cypriots indicates that they in fact perished during the *coup* staged in Cyprus by Greece on 15 July 1974. The Secretary General of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party, Mr. Ezakias Papaiannou, revealed at a public meeting on 28 November . . . that during the armed Greek anti-Makarios *coup* many Greek Cypriots had been killed by those responsible for the *coup*, who had even buried some of them alive. This statement appeared in the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Haravgi* on 29 November 1982.
>
> "Evidently the Greek Cypriot side does not want to solve the missing persons issue within the CMP. They have boycotted its meetings and done everything else to undermine and sabotage the CMP. Confidential CMP documents, including its terms of reference, have been disclosed. The Greek Cypriots have taken this humanitarian issue to every forum except the CMP itself.
>
> "No solution is feasible for this humanitarian problem as long as the Greek Cypriot side continues to exploit it internationally for political propaganda." [*See 2405th meeting, paras. 72-76.*]

92. Today again, it has been alleged by the Greek Cypriot representative that settlers are being brought from Turkey and established in Cyprus. This is erroneous, and the object of the allegation is obviously to draw political profit from misleading public opinion into believing that Turkey is colonizing Cyprus. In fact, these are simply devious tactics designed to make everyone forget those who have really been guilty of trying to colonize Cyprus for decades, plunging the island into a bloodbath in the process.

93. Many false statements have been made also about the granting of title deeds to Greek Cypriots in the north. It is true that there is indeed a law on immovable property, and the fact is that it was designed in order to find a solution to the social and economic problems and difficulties experienced by the Greek Cypriots arriving in considerable numbers from the south as refugees. In order to meet the investment and maintenance capital needs that such large-scale arrivals created and to make them productive, persons having the required qualifications were enabled by law to transfer possession rights to such property to others. This adjustment was the result of a search for a solution and is in no way aimed at instituting any compulsory confiscation of ownership rights, nor does it contradict international law or the rules of transfer of ownership.

94. In another area requiring urgent attention, namely, the monetary and financial field, the Greek Cypriot again today has attempted grossly to distort the efforts of my authorities to establish limited banking institutions and to introduce the use of the Turkish lira. Once again these accusations need to be rebutted by the facts being stated quite clearly: the Turkish Federated State of Kibris, in fulfilment of its obligation to develop the economy and improve the people's standard of living, has decided to establish a development and central bank endowed with limited functions—it will not issue currency—and intended to implement the State's monetary and credit policies.

95. This move was made necessary by the fact that the holdings of the Greek Cypriot part-owners of the development bank in the south were peremptorily expropriated. Furthermore, the currency measures taken by the Turkish Cypriot community were also the result of arbitrary action by the Greek Cypriot-controlled Central Bank, which confiscated the Cyprus pounds deposited by Turkish Cypriots in Turkish banks. Another unit of currency had to be introduced to allow normal transactions to continue, and the Turkish lira was adopted in the north pending a final solution.

96. These unwarranted protests of the Greek Cypriots are nothing other than flagrant interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greek Cypriot community, which has five times the *per capita* income of the Turkish Cypriot community, protests against the Turkish Cypriot efforts at bridging this economic gap; and yet we all know that finding a social and economic balance between the two communities will be one of the bases on which to build a viable political solution of the Cyprus problem.

97. Such is the context in which the Turkish Cypriot community's decisions to establish its own central and development bank, as well as to introduce the Turkish lira, are to be seen, and attempts by the Greek Cypriot representative to make the situation appear otherwise are totally unfounded.

98. At this point I wish to state categorically that General Assembly resolution 37/253, adopted on 13 May 1983, is totally unacceptable to us. That resolution, as a whole, constitutes a serious threat to the continuation of the intercommunal talks. Therefore it is our understanding that if and when the negotiations start, that resolution will not be taken into consideration. I feel it only right that I should inform members of the Council that decisions of the United Nations and of other international bodies which ignore the rights and status of the co-founding partner Turkish Cypriot community of the Republic of Cyprus and the realities of the Cyprus problem do not, in fact, help matters and only make the finding of an agreed political settlement more difficult.

99. Therefore, if resolution 37/253, which, *inter alia*, calls upon all States to "support and help the Government of the Republic of Cyprus"—that is, the Greek Cypriot administration—to exercise sovereignty and control over the entire territory of Cyprus, were to be implemented, it would mean that the Turkish Cypriot community would completely lose all its lawful rights and partnership status which it has been defending at all costs for 20 years and be reduced to serfdom under a Greek-dominated Cyprus, in flagrant violation of all principles of natural justice and humanity. Furthermore, this mandate to the Greek Cypriots of a bicommunal State, in view of the Greek Cypriot mentality and policy regarding Cyprus, is a mandate entitling them to complete their acts of genocide attempted during the years 1963 to 1974 with absolute impunity and under the guise of implementing United Nations resolutions. To this my people will never bow.

100. The Turkish Federated State of Kibris has decided to reassess its position in the light of the gravely defective resolution 37/253. When the competent organs of the Turkish Federated State of Kibris have completed their assessment, their views will appropriately be communicated to the Secretary-General.

101. For the past 20 years the presence of UNFICYP between the two national communities has been deemed essential. Yet we have heard the Greek Cypriot and Greek representatives say that the problem in Cyprus dates back to 1974 and is therefore only nine years old. They completely ignore the period from 1963 to 1974, and we are bound to ask ourselves whether such arguments are really given in good faith.

102. Today, as members of the Council well know, I am participating in the Council's deliberations on the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six months, in order to express the views of the Turkish Cypriot people, exclusively represented by the Turkish Federated State of Kibris. In so doing I wish also to express my gratitude and that of my Government to the Secretary-General for his outstanding dedication and

for his efforts at resolving the Cyprus conflict, a matter which has been on the Council's agenda since the Greek Cypriot onslaught of 1963. Our appreciation goes also to the members of the Secretariat and to the staff in the field, particularly Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Gobbi, Major-General Greindl, Mr. Sherry, Mr. Schiittler-Silva, Mr. Holger and Mr. Picco. We also thank especially the military and civilian personnel who have discharged their important responsibilities with outstanding competence and unimpeachable impartiality.

103. I take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to Turkey for its whole-hearted contribution to intercommunal peace in Cyprus and to the security and economic development of the Turkish community still under Greek Cypriot embargo.

104. The Security Council has just adopted its resolution 534 (1983), extending the mandate of the Force until 15 December 1983. In spite of our irrefutable objections the third preambular paragraph still carries a reference to the so-called Government of Cyprus. As I have stated, and as members of the Council know well, this is a name that the Greek Cypriot faction of the bicommunal Government of Cyprus has arrogated unto itself without any right to the title.

105. As I stated earlier, there has been no government legitimately representative of Cyprus as a whole, legally or politically, since the disruption of the bicommunal partnership Government in 1963. We object to the use of that term because it is utterly misleading, since it reflects neither the legal nor the actual reality of the situation in the island. The two national communities of the island have been the constituent elements of the Cyprus dispute since December 1963. This dispute arose as a consequence of the Greek Cypriot armed attempt to destroy the bicommunal partnership and incorporate Cyprus into Greece. Therefore, to refer to the Greek Cypriot element of the bicommunal Government of Cyprus as "the Government of Cyprus" runs counter to the Basic Articles of the 1960 Constitution. It would seem to give the Greek Cypriot side, at the expense of the Turkish Cypriot side, what the Greek Cypriots have failed to acquire by force since 1963.

106. In paragraph 3 of resolution 534 (1983), the Council requests the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices. My Government welcomes and supports this request. We shall continue to co-operate fully with the dedicated Secretary-General in his mission. As Council members know well, the intercommunal talks continue on the basis of the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980, annexed to document S/14100, incorporating the high-level agreements of 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*] and the bilateral intercommunity agreements, as well as on the basis of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper. In his current report, the Secretary-General states:

> "During the period under review, I have pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council. The intercommunal talks have continued in Nicosia on a regular basis, although the frequency of the meetings was adjusted as necessary."—naturally, this was because of the Greek Cypriots—"The 'evaluation' paper submitted by my Special Representative in November 1981 continued to be used as a structured, substantive method of discussion. The Special Representative reports that the open agenda pattern adopted at the beginning of this year has been helpful in the conduct of the discussions. I continue to hold to the view, which I have consistently expressed, that the intercommunal talks represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process aimed at achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question." [*S/15812, para. 60.*]

107. Furthermore, the substantive paragraphs of the report of the Secretary-General, particularly paragraphs 48, 49, 51 and 60 to 63, are of a nature that underlines once again the fact that the intercommunal talks constitute the best way of resolving the question of Cyprus and that these talks are proceeding in accordance with the Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, on the basis of the bilateral intercommunity agreements and on the basis of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper. We find the approach of the Secretary-General as expressed in these paragraphs constructive and reassuring.

108. But I am sure that the Council will agree with me that the fifth preambular paragraph and paragraph 2 of its resolution 534 (1983) do not accurately reflect the actual basis on which the talks are continuing. Nevertheless, I have been empowered to give consent, on behalf of the Government of the Turkish Cypriot community, to the extension of the mandate of the Force until 15 December 1983. We shall continue, as we have done in the past, to co-operate with the Force and to help in the successful execution of its task.

109. As I have repeatedly stressed in Security Council meetings in the past, we continue to hope that the Force's mandate and *modus operandi* will be revised in accordance with the present realities in Cyprus.

110. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot people deplores the fact that some of the States which contribute troops to UNFICYP chose to depart from their traditional posture of maintaining equal distance and voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 37/253. We hope that those countries will return to their position of not taking sides in the dispute if they wish to retain their impartiality, which is so essential to the carrying out of peace-keeping operations in Cyprus.

111. Let me now express my Government's views in connection with the Secretary-General's report under consideration by the Council. The repeated use of the term "the Government of Cyprus" while referring to the Greek Cypriot administration is regrettable, for there exists no entity in Cyprus at present which could constitutionally or legitimately represent both the Turkish

Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot peoples of Cyprus. As Council members are fully aware, talks between the two national communities are continuing, within the context of the Secretary-General's good offices, in order to establish a legitimate Government of Cyprus representing both national communities. The treatment of the Greek Cypriot side as "the Government", therefore, at a time when the talks are under way, prejudges the outcome of these talks and prejudices the chances of their success. Furthermore, the reference to the Turkish Cypriot component of the binational Republic of Cyprus in the same context as merely "the Turkish Cypriot community" constitutes a grave injustice to the Turkish Cypriot people, which is entitled—legally, morally and legitimately—to a status equal with that of the Greek Cypriot people. This inequitable attitude is also reflected in references to the respective leaders of the two peoples of Cyprus.

112. After December 1983 Archbishop Makarios ruled the land in accordance with his whims and fancies, and never within the context of any constitution or legal authority. Pending the establishment of constitutional order, UNFICYP was sent to Cyprus in March 1964 at the request, and with the consent, of the two communities, and it is with the explicit consent of the two communities that UNFICYP continues to function in the island today.

113. Furthermore, the summit meetings between Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktaş on 12 February 1977 and between Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş on 19 May 1979 were not meetings between the President of one side and the communal leader of the other side, respectively, but between people of equal status representing their respective communities. Archbishop Makarios lost his status as President of Cyprus when he launched his ignominious attack on the Turkish Cypriots and ousted from the legitimate Cyprus Government its Turkish Cypriot component.

114. The take-over and continuation of the office of "President of Cyprus", first in July 1974 by Mr. Glafcos Clerides and then by Archbishop Makarios, followed by Mr. Kyprianou, is as devoid of any legal and constitutional substance as the take-over of that post by the notorious killer Nicos Sampson on 15 July 1974. It is my duty to reaffirm once again, therefore, that, as far as the Turkish Cypriot people is concerned, the re-establishment of the legitimacy of the Cyprus Government, which was destroyed by the 21 December 1963 *coup* perpetrated by Archbishop Makarios, can come about only with the final agreement of the two peoples of Cyprus on the new constitution of the island.

115. In the light of the foregoing, it is our earnest wish—and we believe it is our legitimate right—to expect that one side should not be upgraded in the reports of the Secretary-General at the expense of the other.

116. With regard to the reference in paragraph 29 of the Secretary-General's latest report to complaints about alleged "harassment of Greek Cypriots" in the north, I wish to stress once more that there is not, and there has never been, any question of anybody being subjected to any harassment in the north and that all allegations in this regard—past or present—are totally untrue.

117. Finally, concerning the report, I wish to express our full agreement with the Secretary-General's statement in paragraph 60, as follows:

> "I continue to hold to the view, which I have consistently expressed, that the intercommunal talks represent the best available means of pursuing a concrete and effective negotiating process aimed at achieving an agreed, just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question.".

I wish also to stress the Turkish Cypriots' determination to continue the bilateral negotiating process in a spirit of good will and with a constructive attitude.

118. The concept of equal partnership is inherent in the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus, and in view of the record of Greek violations of this basic principle since 1963, the Turkish Cypriot people will be justified in taking the necessary measures to defend its rights. The ultimate responsibility in this matter rests with the Greek Cypriot leadership.

119. I have listened to the presentation made by the Greek Cypriot representative. I simply cannot understand his behaviour and his political motive. The Greek origin of the word "diplomacy" seems to have been sadly betrayed again today when we heard extraordinary manipulations of the facts. One cannot deny the fact that Greece is the only country responsible—whether under democratically elected Governments or junta régimes—for all the calamities that have befallen the island of Cyprus since the 1880s, a century ago. The annals of the United Nations are full of the atrocities committed by the Greeks in Cyprus against my people, the Turkish Cypriot community. I shall therefore refrain from answering their baseless and false accusations in detail. Let history be the judge.

120. In concluding, I must confirm once again before this body that the sincere hope of the Turkish people in Cyprus is that the Greek Cypriot leadership will come to the negotiating table with the resolute intention of developing the bizonal federal system in Cyprus in a spirit of equal partnership and on the basis of the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980.

121. The Turkish people of Cyprus and its Government have been doing and will continue to do their utmost in order to bring about such a solution. However, in spite of the repeated assertions by the Greek Cypriot leadership that sovereignty in Cyprus belongs exclusively to them, the Turkish Cypriot people must also assert that, in reality, the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus can be the outcome only of an equal partnership between the two communities. And I must warn all concerned that every time the Greek Cypriot people rejects this partnership by word or by deed, each time it violates the inalienable rights and status of the

Turkish people of Cyprus, my community will, as a last resort, consider itself at liberty, and even duty-bound, to do everything possible to defend its right of partnership and its inherent right to self-determination.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Conference on Cyprus: Documents signed and initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959*, Cmnd. 679 (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1959).

[2] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

[3] Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (*ibid.*, vol. 397, No. 5712).

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SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2454th MEETING: 15 JUNE 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2454th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 15 June 1983, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2454)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15812 and Add.1)

The meeting was called to order at 4.40 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Cyprus: report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (S/15812 and Add.1)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at the 2453rd meeting, I invite the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to take places at the Council table. I invite the representative of Canada to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Moushoutas (Cyprus), Mr. Dountas (Greece) and Mr. Kirca (Turkey) took places at the Council table; Mr. Pelletier (Canada) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: The first speaker is the representative of Turkey, on whom I now call.

3. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): I should like at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June and also to compliment you on the impartiality with which you conducted consultations with the parties concerned before today's meetings. I should like also to take this opportunity to say how much the Government and people of Turkey, which to the best of their ability assisted Zimbabwe in the course of its independence struggle, are following with interest and sympathy that country's growth and development.

4. The Council is meeting today at a time when the question of Cyprus has just entered a delicate stage following the recent debate in the General Assembly and the adoption by that body on 13 May of its resolution 37/253, which Turkey and the Government of the Turkish community of Cyprus immediately rejected *in toto*. It is a time when each of us should reflect on the profoundly harmful effect which this unrealistic, unjust and futile exercise has had on the progress of the intercommunal negotiations.

5. The Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey are in no way responsible for this deplorable situation. They made it clear from the very outset that even if it were to be supposed that this exercise had taken place under the best conditions imaginable it could only have added to the considerable acrimony which already existed between the two communities and have caused a regrettable delay in the intercommunal negotiations. But the debate took place in an unprecedented atmosphere of a lack of realism, of bias, of lies and of injustice which bore out our apprehensions all too well.

6. First of all, it took place in conditions of inequality for the two communities. The General Assembly, forgetting that the intercommunal negotiations are taking place on the basis of equality in accordance with Security Council resolutions, and still clinging to the false and unfounded supposition of the existence of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, persisted in its error by refusing to establish a procedure which would have given the Turkish Cypriot community the opportunity on an equal footing to explain and argue its point of view.

7. Secondly, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly after that debate marred by procedural shortcomings was nothing more than a flagrant denial of the recent history of Cyprus and a tacit—but none the less dangerous—justification of the violation of the most sacred principles which are supposed to govern civilized societies, such as the principle of the inviolability of international treaties, the principle of the supremacy of the rule of law and the principle of legitimate individual or collective self-defence. Furthermore, the text contradicted the provisions of the high-level agreements between the two communities. It could be used to attempt to destroy the political and legal basis of the good offices mission of the Secretary-General with which he was entrusted exclusively by Security Council resolutions and to set aside the mutually accepted framework and bases for these negotia-

tions being conducted under the auspices of the Secretary-General. But the height of injustice and unreality was attained when the text called upon all States to assist the Greek Cypriot administration, the usurper of the title of Government of Cyprus, to regain its so-called sovereignty over the territory inhabited almost exclusively by the Turkish Cypriot community. That would mean aiding a puppet army set up by trampling under foot the provisions of the Cypriot Constitution and the Treaty of Alliance[1] and the Treaty of Guarantee,[2] both of 1960, and manned and commanded by officers who were appointed from Greece by the Greek Government. If such a stupid undertaking were ever to come about, there would be no room for doubt that these fantastical adventurers would learn a painful lesson as they have in the past.

8. But the very fact that this inappropriate appeal appears in the text of the General Assembly resolution can only serve to heighten the vigilance of the Turkish Cypriot community and of Turkey. I therefore declare with all solemnity that Turkey will continue to protect the Turkish Cypriot community in that island where its members have lived for more than four centuries, and that the Turkish armed forces will remain there, standing firm, at the request of the Government of the Turkish Cypriot community until a definitive solution has been agreed to by all the interested parties, including the necessary security arrangements for that community.

9. Without question, that definitive solution should prohibit both union of the Republic of Cyprus with another State and its partition into two States.

10. The Greek side, particularly following the official release of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" paper of 18 November 1981, has systematically attempted to avoid detailed discussion of that document. As I have just stressed, the General Assembly resolution, unfortunately, contains provisions which tend to encourage it in this.

11. In this connection, I must recall once again that the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey rejected that resolution and that the Greek side maintains its desperate pretense that this unjust, illogical and inappropriate text is the "verdict of the international community". It is merely a high-sounding but meaningless slogan to be added to the misleading literature on the subject. There is no such "verdict of the international community".

12. There is simply a recommendation which has been made by a body whose authority is well defined and can in no way supersede the sovereign rights of States. The recommendations of that body as such can of course be accepted or rejected by States. These recommendations may contribute to the preservation of peace and the settlement of international disputes only if they remain closely wedded to truth and all the general principles, without exception, of morality and law which form the basis of the Charter of the United Nations. But this text is far from meeting these criteria. As a recommendation that was totally rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey, it has absolutely no value whatsoever and can in no way be taken into account during the intercommunal talks.

13. Hence the Greek side must harbour no hopes in this connection. If the Greek side, in violation of the mutually accepted framework of the intercommunal talks, continues to try to destroy that framework and to replace it by a one-sided and tendentious text, it will once again simply have succeeded in holding up the negotiations and the efforts at finding a definitive solution. That could provide the Greek side with a pretext for evading responsibility for such possible delay on the Turkish side. But all the delays which have been encountered during the negotiations are due to the express requests and the attitude of the Greek Cypriot side, and the same would be true this time. At any rate, the Greek side should not be so misguided as to believe that any of its manoeuvres can make the least impression on the Turkish side.

14. How in these circumstances can one continue to hope for success from the intercommunal talks? How can one still harbour the belief that these negotiations remain the best possible way of finding a definitive solution to a painful problem which has lasted too long?

15. Nevertheless, Mr. Nail Atalay, the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community, has just stated in the Council [*2453rd meeting*] that his Government continues to pin its hopes on these talks and does not intend to leave the negotiating table. For its part the Turkish Government supports and encourages it in this attitude. Why has the Turkish Cypriot community persisted in this stance and why has my Government encouraged it, despite the well-justified exasperation of the Turkish community of the island in the face of the manoeuvres of the Greek side and all the injustice it has suffered?

16. It must be confessed that this positive attitude of the Turkish side *vis-à-vis* the intercommunal talks stems not only from the traditional wisdom and the wealth of diplomatic experience which are some of the characteristics of the Turkish people, but also from the sagacity, perseverance, honesty and sense of realism of the Secretary-General.

17. Indeed, it is thanks to the Secretary-General's efforts that the Turkish side was able to rekindle its desire to support the intercommunal talks. My Government was gratified to note the Secretary-General's statements, in particular those in paragraphs 48, 49, 51 and 60 to 63 of his report, which is now before us. The Turkish Government believes that these statements provide sufficient reassurance for the Turkish Cypriot community to continue believing the intercommunal talks to be the best possible way of bringing about a definitive solution to the question of Cyprus.

18. In this connection I should like to state, for the benefit of the Greek Cypriot representative and at the request of the Turkish Cypriot representative, that it is not true that the Secretary-General or his Special Representative in Cyprus has requested a meeting of the negotiators of both communities in order to discuss the

Secretary-General's intention to increase his own personal participation.

19. As I informed the General Assembly on 12 May last, at the 120th meeting of the thirty-seventh session, at the express request of the Government of the Turkish Cypriot community, and as the representative of that community has just informed the Council, the Turkish Cypriot community is in the process of re-assessing its position in the light of the circumstances now prevailing as a result of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 37/253. This re-assessment has not yet been concluded. None the less, neither the fact that this re-assessment is continuing nor its results will in any way, as the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community has just stated, weaken the determination of this community to continue the intercommunal talks with the aim of arriving at a comprehensive agreement whose principles and objectives are defined in the high-level intercommunal agreements of 2 August 1975 [*see S/11789, annex*], 12 February 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 19 May 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*] and in the opening statement of the Secretary-General of 9 August 1980 [*S/14100, annex*]—that is to say, a Republic of Cyprus that is independent, sovereign, bicommunal, bizonal, federal and, if it so chooses, non-aligned. For its part Turkey continues and will continue firmly to support these principles and objectives.

20. The Turkish Cypriot community's work of re-evaluation following the adoption of Assembly resolution 37/253 has not yet been concluded, as I just pointed out. Whatever the results of this re-evaluation, Turkey will respect the decisions which are democratically taken by the Turkish Cypriot community, while firmly supporting that community's desire to continue the intercommunal talks, since that desire will hardly be affected by any decisions stemming from this re-evaluation.

21. I have already made my basic comments on the Secretary-General's report. I should now like to make further comments on certain other passages in the report. My Government wishes to enter distinct reservations on some of the specific points taken up therein. In order not to abuse the Council's time, I shall raise them later with the Secretary-General himself. However, I cannot refrain from stating here and now that it is regrettable to see that the principle of equality of the two communities—an integral part of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus—was not respected in the titles used to designate their officials. Furthermore, the administration of the Greek Cypriot community is designated as the Government of Cyprus, a capacity which that administration is not legitimately and legally eligible to claim.

22. Hence my first observation on the text of resolution 534 (1983), adopted by the Council at the previous meeting, is on the reference in the third preambular paragraph to the so-called "Government of Cyprus". For reasons which my Government has constantly reiterated, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot community are no more than usurpers of the title of "Government of Cyprus". The Republic of Cyprus was established by international treaty. Faithful to its international commitments, Turkey refuses to recognize their claim to that title, a title which in no way reflects the actual situation in which each of two distinct communal administrations governs its own community in its own zone, as envisaged in the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974 [*see S/11398*]. That is why the third preambular paragraph of the resolution remains unacceptable to Turkey.

23. I should also like to inform the Council of the fact that the various reservations entered by Turkey and its positions in connection with the texts referred to in this same resolution and in the Secretary-General's report have not at all changed and remain equally valid for the resolution that has been adopted today and for the Secretary-General's report now before us.

24. You will undoubtedly recall, Mr. President, that in the course of the consultations you were kind enough to conduct in this connection, my Government supported the point of view of the Government of the Turkish Cypriot community that the important events which have occurred since the conclusion of the high-level agreement of 1979 should be reflected in the text of the resolution.

25. First is the resumption of intercommunal negotiations that took place thanks to the Secretary-General's opening statement of 9 August 1980. That statement contains elements of considerable importance which at present constitute one of the foundations of those negotiations. The Turkish Government does not understand why any reference to that statement has been avoided. Nevertheless, my Government would like to reiterate its view that that statement continues to be one of the bases of those negotiations.

26. Furthermore, the presentation of the Secretary-General's "evaluation" of 18 November 1981 is in itself an event of singular importance which should have been referred to in the resolution.

27. The resolution extends the stationing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a further period of six months. Since the representative of the Government of the Turkish community in Cyprus has just informed the Council of the assent of his authorities [*2453rd meeting*], the Turkish Government, for its part, also agrees to this extension. Nevertheless, I should like to draw the Council's attention to the request made by that representative, just as on several similar occasions before the Council, to the effect that the mandate of the Force, drawn up in 1964, should be revised and brought more into line with present conditions in Cyprus. The Turkish Government fully supports that request.

28. Finally, I should like to draw the Council's attention to the behaviour of certain Governments that provided contingents for the Force in the General Assembly at the time of the adoption of resolution 37/253. In the opinion of my Government, their behaviour is likely to cast serious doubts on the ability of the Force to fulfil its functions objectively and impartially. If those Govern-

ments do not reconsider and realize that the presence of their contingents in that United Nations Force necessarily implies that they are duty-bound to maintain total impartiality and equal distance between the two parties concerned, they must realize that their contribution can no longer be considered as serving the cause of peace and understanding in Cyprus. The Major-General who commands the United Nations Force in Cyprus still retains the confidence of my Government. Nevertheless, my Government believes it its duty and that of the Secretary-General to issue the necessary warnings to those Governments.

29. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Canada. I invite him to take a seat at the Council table and to make his statement.

30. Mr. PELLETIER (Canada): I should like, at the outset, Sir, to convey to you the best wishes of my delegation for the period during which you will be President of the Security Council. Our two countries have worked closely together and indeed share a common concern for the peaceful resolution of a stubborn and difficult problem which has just been the object of the Council's attention. I am particularly glad, therefore, of this opportunity to pay a public tribute to you and to your country for the well-deserved honour of presiding over affairs of this important body. I should like also, through you, to thank the members of the Security Council for having acceded to our request briefly to address the Council after the mandate of UNFICYP has been renewed.

[*The speaker continued in French.*]

31. My Government has already advised the Secretary-General that we are prepared to continue our commitment to UNFICYP for the mandate period which the Council has just approved. However, we wish to take this opportunity to place before the Council Canada's concerns over the unsatisfactory situation in regard to Cyprus. We believe that our record in this and other peace-keeping enterprises clearly demonstrates our determination to act consistently and responsibly in that cause, which is a key element in carrying out the important responsibility of the Organization to maintain international peace and security.

32. No one can dispute that the presence of the United Nations Force has prevented a recurrence of the intercommunal fighting and has contributed powefully to the restoration and maintenance of law and order. However, the primary objective of the Force mandate—to facilitate the achievement of a negotiated settlement and a return to peaceful conditions—has unfortunately eluded us for over 19 years.

33. The formation and maintenance of UNFICYP have provided the necessary stable conditions under which the peace-making process should have succeeded long ago. The United Nations has done all that is possible to create and maintain those conditions in Cyprus. Thus we must ask ourselves what has been the cause of failure.

34. My Government believes that the two communities of Cyprus and the other parties involved in the dispute have displayed a regrettable lack of will to make the necessary and admittedly difficult compromises required for a successful political settlement. We therefore call on those parties to enter serious and substantial discussions in a spirit of compromise and conciliation. Canada very much hopes that a clear indication of progress will be evident before the end of the mandate period just now approved.

35. As troop contributors to UNFICYP, we have remained neutral and impartial towards all aspects of the question of Cyprus, both within the United Nations and in our bilateral relations with the parties concerned. Canada continues to be willing to assist in the peace-keeping process but is anxious to ensure that there is tangible evidence that the complementary process of peace-making is progressing. Our patience and resources are not boundless.

36. We do not consider that the intercommunal differences can ever be resolved merely by a virtually atomatic extension of the UNFICYP mandate every six months. UNFICYP of itself cannot bring about a settlement of the problem. There must be a recommitment by the parties themselves to seek compromise through genuine negotiations intended to bring about a just and lasting solution. Unless there is a negotiated settlement, peace and stability will continue to elude the people of Cyprus.

37. It is against this background that I wish to reaffirm Canada's strong support for the Secretary-General in his efforts, as he phrased it in his report to the General Assembly last month,[3] to "give fresh impetus to the negotiating process" among the parties concerned. We very much hope that all interested countries will do likewise.

38. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Cyprus has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply and I call on him.

39. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): It is indeed with reluctance that I ask to speak. I am obliged, however, to do so in order to set the record straight and to defend my Government and people, all our people, irrespective of ethnic background, against the unsubstantiated charges levelled against them. I do so in the hope that if certain facts are made abundantly clear to the Council and the problem we face is seen in its right perspective, a positive contribution will be made to the efforts under way for a just and lasting solution.

40. As I did in previous Council meetings, I shall address my remarks only to the representative of Turkey. I do not intend to disregard, nor do I believe the members of the Council will disregard, the lengthy statement of the individual who was allowed to speak in his personal capacity under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure, only to abuse the privilege in order to complement the voice of the occupying Power in my country.

41. In spite of this statement, I feel that Turkey is the principal and that Turkey is the one which made both statements. For he who does things through others does them himself. I will disregard the implied reference as to the legality of my delegation. As I have said time and again, the fact that I address this body as the representative of a Member State of the United Nations under rule 37 is, I believe, a sufficient reply to this oft-repeated Turkish allegation.

42. As to the Turkish allegation about the legality of my Government and its reference to the Geneva Declaration, I should like to read the exact and full wording of the relevant part of the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974, upon which the Turkish representative relies. Let me remind the Council that that meeting took place 10 days after the onslaught upon our people and that the meeting was attended by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. The relevant part reads as follows:

> "Among the constitutional questions to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution. The Ministers noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community." [*See S/11398, para. 5.*]

43. Let me say, first, that Cyprus was not represented at the Geneva meeting, nor was the lawful Government of the Republic consulted.

44. Secondly, in any event, the above quotation refers to "community administrations", which do not pre-empt the existence of the Government either at that time or thereafter.

45. Thirdly, the above quotation was part of a "cease-fire" arrangement made subject, under its article 2, to the undertaking that "the areas controlled by opposing armed forces on 30 July 1974 should not be extended". And I underline this. Turkey violated that condition on 14 August 1974 and proceeded to occupy almost 40 per cent of the area of the Republic. Turkey cannot now be expected to invoke a part of an arrangement which Turkey itself first violated and ignored.

46. Fourthly, the Geneva Declaration has no legal force whatsoever, was violated by Turkey on 14 August 1974 by the second round of the invasion, and has in any case been repeatedly superseded by subsequent events, declarations and resolutions.

47. Fifthly, the Republic of Cyprus and its Government have been consistently and exclusively recognized by the United Nations and all international organizations and in all international forums where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is recognized, as the only representative of the Republic of Cyprus.

48. Sixthly, a host of resolutions have been adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council recognizing the Cyprus Government, the latest of which are Security Council resolution 534 (1983) of today and General Assembly resolution 37/253.

49. It is very interesting to note that when the so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared in February 1975 and recourse was had by my Government to the Security Council, the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ivor Richard, said on 4 March 1975 in the Council that his delegation would like to make clear that as far as it was concerned, the declaration of a Turkish Federated State "does not alter our attitude towards the legitimate Government of Cyprus, nor towards our obligations under the 1960 Treaties" [*see 1818th meeting, para. 13*]. He said specifically, "There is only one legitimate Republic of Cyprus, and there is only one Government." [*Ibid.*]

50. The views of the Greek Government are well known to the members of the Council.

51. The second argument made by the representative of Turkey is that the Turkish Cypriot members of the Government were expelled. I must state that it was the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, the three Ministers and Turkish Cypriot Members of Parliament who, acting upon instructions from Turkey, withdrew from the Government. They were not expelled. Why did they withdraw? The answer is obvious: upon instructions from Ankara, with the aim of destroying the Constitution and to further the partitionist goals of Turkey.

52. The Vice-President, Mr. Fazil Küçük, answered this question eloquently when he stated, as quoted in *The New York Times* of 31 December 1963, "The Cyprus Constitution is dead." He further stated, according to the special news bulletin of 5 January 1964: "It is out of the question to collaborate any longer with the Government." Where is the expulsion? Nowhere, I submit, but here is evidence of the purpose for their withdrawal, and I quote from the same bulletin: "Cyprus will be divided into two sections, one of which will join Turkey." That statement was made by the former Vice-President of Turkey, Kemal Satir, in 1964. From Mr. F. C. Erkin, the then Foreign Minister of Turkey, we have this most revealing statement in June 1964: "The radical solution would be to cede one part of Cyprus to Greece and the other closest to the Turkish Asiatic Coast to Turkey."

53. The Turkish representative spoke about equality and about partnership. Partnership is based on equity. Partnership does not mean the strangulation of democracy. We accept that each citizen has equal rights, equal opportunities, that he has the right to a vote and a right to have that vote counted. But numerical equality of a community in the executive, legislative and judicial branches we cannot accept. We cannot accept that 18 per cent equals 82 per cent. Such numerical equality strikes at the roots of democracy and causes inequality. By creating inequality we strike at the balance upon which a federal State is to be based.

54. The Turkish representative repeatedly referred to his favourite topic, *enosis*, but for every quotation the Turkish representative can present on *enosis* I can present one on *taqsim*—that is, partition—the aim of the Turkish Government in Cyprus.

55. There is, however, a difference between the two. While the Greek Cypriots were simply speaking about *enosis*, Turkey acted on its pronouncement. It is no secret that the right to self-determination claimed by the Cypriots during the colonial years was aiming at *enosis*. Nor can it be disputed that in 1960 Archbishop Makarios, at that time the protagonist for the right to self-determination and *enosis*, became the first President of the independent, sovereign State of Cyprus and that he subsequently fought three elections and won against candidates who had *enosis* as a platform, and most importantly that the *coup* against him in 1974 was caused because he was not pursuing *enosis*.

56. But what about today? There is an independent, sovereign and non-aligned State Member of the United Nations, and I assure members of the Council that it struggles to remain so. Its House of Representatives declared on 20 September 1979 and 2 October 1981 its immovable aim to achieve full independence and its rejection of any solution that would abolish that independence or call for any annexation of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, in whole or in part, by any other State. It further stipulated its rejection of any partition or the declaration of any part of Cyprus as an independent State.

57. I have, I believe, covered the question of *enosis*. The question of partition is a matter for the Turkish Government to explain. The attempt by the Turkish representative to justify, in a United Nations era, the invasion of Cyprus under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee[2] is, to say the least, to be oblivious and completely disrespectful of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 2, paragraph 4, which calls upon Member States to refrain from the use of force in their international relations. Turkey used the *coup d'état* of 15 July 1974 as a pretext to invade Cyprus, and the consequences of the invasion show that its actions were not those of a guarantor to restore constitutional order in Cyprus. It should be pointed out that article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee calls for the guaranteeing Powers to act jointly, and if this should not prove possible each guaranteeing Power has the right to "take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the . . . Treaty". That article does not refer to nor allow military action or use of armed force, as Turkey claims. If this were so, article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee would be contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, which is the pre-emptory norm of international law, from which no derogation is allowed. It should be remembered that Article 103 of the Charter clearly states that obligations under the Charter shall prevail over obligations of a State under any other international agreement.

58. Of course Turkey did not invade with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty, but to destroy it. Under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey undertook to guarantee the constitutional order of Cyprus and nothing else. That this was not the aim of Turkey is proved by the fact that Turkey is not supporting a return to the 1960 constitutional order. Instead, even to this day, Turkey is advocating other constitutional orders.

59. As to the Turkish allegation that the invasion was carried out in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, I will simply say that Turkey has never been entrusted with the task of protecting the rights of any specific community or individual in Cyprus. It is only the *status quo* that Turkey has been protecting. None of the guarantors is the protector of any specific community.

60. We heard today an allegation by the Turkish representative that the invasion was for reasons of self-defence. The validity of that argument I leave to the judgement of Council members, considering that Cyprus is 100 times smaller than Turkey, the latter having one of the mightiest armies in the world. My Minister was absolutely right in making the statement in the 116th meeting of the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly about Turkey's trying to devour little Cyprus.

61. The Turkish representative referred also to "a population exchange agreement", which the Turkish Cypriot leadership presents as a reason for its partitionist and colonization policies and as an excuse for not complying with the agreements of 12 February 1977 [*see S/12323, para. 5*] and 19 May 1979 [*see S/13369, para. 51*]. It would be ironic, indeed, for anyone to allege that the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees came to the free areas of the republic voluntarily. It was the invasion, it was the Turkish tanks and Turkish bayonets which forced one third of the population of Cyprus to abandon their ancestral homes and properties and seek refuge in the free areas of the Republic. How could the agreement of July-August 1975 [*see S/11789, annex*] be described as a "population exchange agreement" when in paragraph 2 it was stated that:

> "Mr. Denktaş reaffirmed, and it was agreed, that the Greek Cypriots at present in the north of the island are free to stay and that they will be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practise of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the north."

How could that agreement be defined as a "population exchange agreement" when in paragraph 5 it was stipulated that:

> "In connexion with the implementation of the above agreement priority will be given to the reunification of families, which may also involve the transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the south, to the north"?

It also provided in paragraph 4 that "The United Nations will have free and normal access to Greek Cypriot villages and habitations in the north".

62. What was the outcome of that agreement? The Turkish side violated immediately each and every one of its provisions. A mere look at the periodical reports of the Secretary-General on the question of Cyprus will show everyone how the Turkish leadership honours its signature: the Greek Cypriots enclaved in the occupied area were forced to leave their homes to join the other Greek Cypriot refugees fleeing to the free areas of the Republic. Instead of help being given to them to lead a normal life, their plight became even more miserable. Their education was hampered, as was the practise of their religion. No medical care by their own doctors was allowed and their freedom of movement was hindered. As regards the freedom of movement of UNFICYP in the occupied areas, there has for nine years now appeared in every bi-annual report of the Secretary-General a special paragraph devoted to the restrictions imposed on UNFICYP.

63. The Turkish representative tried to represent the blem of Cyprus as a dispute between the two communities, and not one of invasion and occupation. If it were not one of invasion and occupation, which is an international problem, this subject would not have been debated today before this very Council.

64. The Turkish representative referred to oppression of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Cyprus Government. That allegation of oppression of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Cyprus Government is pure political propaganda, used in the past by Turkey to pave the way as a pre-emptive justification for the invasion, and it is now used to justify the continuation of the military occupation of territory of the Republic of Cyprus under the pretext of protecting the Turkish Cypriot community, as we heard today.

65. Now, what are the facts? For centuries, all Cypriots, whether Greeks, Turks, Armenians or Maronites, lived and worked side by side in peace and harmony, in mixed villages. This is proof of the security, safety and peaceful co-existence enjoyed by all, and of the historical links which were forged among them.

66. Never in the history of Cyprus prior to the 1955-to-1959 anti-colonial struggle were any clashes recorded between the two communities. It was Ankara's policies of segregation and partition, implemented by the extremist elements of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, that brought about the artificial barriers between the Greek and the Turkish communities. Ample evidence of this is provided by the regular bi-annual reports of then Secretary-General U Thant, which irrefutably show the falsehood of allegations of mistreatment of the Turkish Cypriot community by the Government of Cyprus. Here are quotations from two of these reports, the first dated 15 June 1964:

> "the lack of movement of Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is also believed to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation." [*See S/5764, para. 113.*]

And from 10 June 1965:

> "the hardships suffered by the Turkish Cypriot population are the direct result of the leadership's self-isolation policy, imposed by force on the rank and file." [*See S/6426, para. 106.*]

67. The Turkish representative denied the existence in Cyprus of settlers, but there is undeniable evidence of this. The British newspaper *The Guardian* wrote on 18 October 1975 that

> "Migration of Turks to the northern Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus is taking place on a scale that will soon radically alter the racial balance of the island and could seriously affect the chances of a political solution."

The Turkish Government originally claimed that these settlers were "seasonal workers" brought to Cyprus to work in the fields. Mr. Caglayangil's statement of 27 October 1975, made during his tenure as Foreign Minister of Turkey, is a case in point. It is very strange that in an area where unemployment was about 25 per cent there was a need for the importation of agricultural help, especially as we know that most of the Turkish Cypriots are employed in the agricultural sector.

68. The revelations of the settler Colonel Ismail Tezer, who participated in the invasion and who is, incidentally, a leader of a Turkish Cypriot party, speak louder than any attempts of Turkey to conceal the truth. Colonel Tezer, in a press conference held on 17 December 1978, openly declared that the settlers came to Cyprus with the approval of Turkey, that they were represented as agricultural workers, and that almost all of them were made Cypriot citizens. These actions were deplored not only in United Nations resolutions and non-aligned declarations, but also by the Turkish Cypriots themselves. The former Vice-President of Cyprus, Mr. Küçük, wrote in *Halkin Sesi* on 24 May 1978 that these settlers had "turned this paradise island into Hell".

69. The representative of Turkey tried to justify the setting up of a central bank as being called for by the economic needs of the Turkish Cypriot community. The actions taken to establish a central bank and to introduce the Turkish lira to replace the Cyprus pound constitute a purely divisive policy of Ankara aimed at partitioning the occupied areas and at incorporating them with the mainland of Turkey. These illegal actions, which are economic in nature, are now added to the political, geographical and social efforts for separation in the island.

70. There is one central bank in each country, whether the system is unitary or federal. The creation of a second

central bank is, therefore, divisive and partitionist. The argument put forth today by the Turkish side that this central bank created by Turkey in the occupied areas of Cyprus does not have the main function of issuing money is meant to deceive, since at the same time Turkey introduced the Turkish lira in the occupied areas.

71. Regarding missing persons—a humanitarian matter completely separate from the political aspects of the problem of Cyprus—the questions which have been addressed to the Turkish Government emanate from the facts themselves. There are prisoners of war in the hands of Turkish troops; they were photographed by Turkish or foreign journalists. These people were not released when the exchange of prisoners of war took place.

72. There are cases of people whose names were on the official Turkish lists of prisoners of war but who were never released and whose existence has since that time been denied. There are cases where the names of people held in concentration camps in occupied Cyprus were on the lists of the International Committee of the Red Cross but who were also never released. There are people who, after they were captured, were heard on the clandestine Turkish Cypriot radio three weeks after the cease-fire and who continue to be missing. The claim that these people disappeared prior to the Turkish invasion of the island is baseless. If the Turkish side would agree to co-operate on this humanitarian problem, which, as I said before, is separate from the political aspects of the problem of Cyprus, then the full truth of the matter would be established. The fact that they refuse to permit appropriate international bodies to assist the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus speaks clearly of their motives.

73. I should like finally to refer to another matter raised by the Turkish side: the Turkish side wants to apply the right of self-determination to a community within a State, irrespective of and contrary to the wishes of a people as a whole and in utter violation of the unity and territorial integrity of a State. If by some stretch of the imagination it should ever be applied, it would dismember every State and nation on the face of this Earth, including Turkey. As to the territory targeted for the setting up of this fictitious state, I would remind the representative of Turkey that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has full rights of *de jure* jurisdiction and control, as reconfirmed by General Assembly resolution 37/253.

74. The representative of Greece has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I call on him.

75. Mr. DOUNTAS (Greece): I am fully aware that a speech at this late hour might prove to be counterproductive for the cause of the speaker, because even the most diligent Council member is labouring under exhaustion and sleepiness. I feel, however, compelled to take the risk and to appeal for the Council's attention for a few minutes.

76. In the first place, I would mention Mr. Atalay's speech this morning. I found striking similarities between that speech and the one delivered by the representative of Turkey, Mr. Kirca, in the 116th meeting of the General Assembly's thirty-seventh session, about four weeks ago: similarities of style, similarities of content—the same inaccuracies—and even similarities with regard to the length of the speech. That is why I will limit myself to referring to the reply I gave on that occasion, which is reflected in paragraphs 316 to 326 of the verbatim record of the 120th meeting.

77. There was only one point in Mr. Atalay's statement that I should like to mention more particularly. Terminating his speech in rhetorical euphoria, he said that history had borne witness to the many atrocities of the Greeks for centuries. I would submit that if I were a Turk, as is Mr. Atalay, I would have been more cautious when invoking history as a witness to atrocities and acts of genocide.

78. As to the statement of Mr. Kirca, I should like to express my surprise at the wealth of adjectives he found to characterize a recent resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 37/253. He said that that resolution is unrealistic, unjust, futile, irresponsible and so on. I leave it to the 103 countries that voted in favour of that resolution and to the 20 countries that abstained to judge the value of the courteous and flattering adjectives with which their position has been characterized.

79. I would make another point concerning Mr. Kirca's statement. He said that that resolution was null and void, and of absolutely no value since it had been rejected by the Turkish side. I would like to ask him if he is going to introduce a new amendment to the provisional rules of procedure and if he is trying to replace the rule of majority by the rule of unanimity. In my very humble view, resolutions adopted even by simple majority are valid *erga omnes*.

80. Finally I should like to refer to another statement of the Turkish representative. He said that the Turkish troops of occupation in Cyprus will remain as long as the problem is pending and until a solution is found. I take it that the talks envisaged by the Secretary-General will be conducted under the pressure of a foreign army, with all the freedom that such pressure implies. I leave it to the Secretary-General to evaluate that statement, which was made with the arrogance of the conqueror, within the context of his forthcoming initiative.

81. No matter what rhetorical phrases are going to be used, nobody can blur the obvious—namely, that in the Republic of Cyprus there is foreign occupation in flagrant violation of all international law. This sheer truth cannot be denied, no matter what firecrackers of phraseology one may use. And this occupation, which is an international anomaly, if continued will not help at all in any efforts towards finding a solution to the problem.

82. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of Turkey, who has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

83. Mr. KIRCA (Turkey) (*interpretation from French*): I have not prepared a second statement, but I do want briefly to exercise my right of reply.

84. I note that the Greek representatives have an irreversible faith in the magic of words. They are blind to realities and have contempt for the truth. Most of their allegations, which they have just repeated, found suitable replies in my statement and in that of the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. That is why I find it unnecessary again to make a detailed reply to them.

85. As for the reference to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the application of its Article IV, that article did not oblige Turkey to consult with Greece before its intervention since, as has just been admitted by the representative of the Greek Cypriot community, Greece itself was the instigator of the *coup d'état* for union with Greece.

86. In addition, the Treaty of Guarantee guaranteed only the state of affairs created by the Basic Articles of the Cypriot Constitution. That Constitution and its Basic Articles were completely disregarded by the Greeks, which shows that even those Basic Articles were inadequate to guarantee and safeguard the state of affairs they created. This shows that in order to safeguard the same state of affairs we need bi-zonal and federal institutions. That is the whole purpose of the intercommunal talks.

87. One point concerning the Geneva Conference of 1974. It was my honour to be the Vice-Chairman of the Turkish delegation during that Conference. Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the Greek Cypriot representative, stated, when the Conference resumed with the participation of both communities, that his administration completely subscribed to the Geneva Declaration in question. All the provisions of that Declaration were violated by the Greek Cypriot administration, and that brought about the second intervention by Turkey, in 1974. Those who have violated an agreement are not entitled to declare it null and void.

88. As regards the reference to certain Turkish individuals, we must say that they are completely unfounded.

89. Mr. MOUSHOUTAS (Cyprus): In my statement I did not say that the *coup* aimed at *enosis*. As a matter of fact the "coup-ists", once they had established themselves, called for negotiations, for the continuation of the intercommunal talks.

90. Secondly, as to the accusation that we are not realists, well, we believe in justice and we believe in the Charter of the United Nations.

91. The PRESIDENT: There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Statement by the President

92. The PRESIDENT: As this is the last meeting of the Security Council to take place before the end of the period covered in the Council's annual report to the General Assembly, submitted in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, of the Charter, it has been agreed that I should place on record the fact that, since 21 December 1982, the Council has been engaged in consultations with all members in connection with the issues raised in the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, submitted to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, during which members have explored possible ways and means for enhancing the effectiveness of the Council in accordance with the powers entrusted to it under the Charter. These far-ranging consultations are being pursued in private on a continuing basis, and the Council is exploring means of presenting an interim account of the progress of its work.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.

NOTES

[1] Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 397, No. 5712).

[2] *Ibid.*, vol. 382, No. 5475.

[3] A/37/805.

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UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2455th MEETING: 29 JUNE 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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2455th MEETING

Held in New York on Wednesday, 29 June 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu MASHINGAIDZE (Zimbabwe).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2455)

1. Adoption of the agenda.

2. Complaint by Lesotho against South Africa: Report of the Secretary-General (S/15600)

The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Complaint by Lesotho against South Africa: Report of the Secretary-General (S/15600)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Lesotho, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Thamae (Lesotho) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them the report submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 527 (1982).

3. Members of the Council have also received photocopies of a letter dated 29 June from the representative of South Africa [*S/15847*].

4. I call upon the representative of Lesotho.

5. Mr. THAMAE (Lesotho): My delegation wishes to congratulate you most heartily, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for the month of June. As the representative of the Republic of Zimbabwe, a country with which my own country, Lesotho, enjoys warm and friendly relations, you have proved to be an outstanding and worthy diplomat.

6. Similarly, I wish to congratulate your predecessor, the representative of Zaire, on his able leadership of the Council last month.

7. I wish also to express my delegation's gratitude to the Council for having responded to our request to discuss the matter now before it. This demonstrates the support and sympathy my country enjoys among the members of the Council, and it is a source of encouragement to us.

8. We appear before the Council not so much to recall the events of 9 December 1982 as to follow up on the efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General aimed at implementing Council resolution 527 (1982). My Government is highly appreciative of the Secretary-General's report on assistance to Lesotho, which is now before the Council, and fully endorses its contents.

9. Since members of the Council are already familiar with the contents of the report I shall refrain from repeating them. I wish only to highlight some of the recommendations made therein. Obviously it was not only on 9 December 1982, when South Africa unleashed its forces of aggression against Lesotho, that some, if not most, of the economic projects outlined in the report became important and urgent. Lesotho has been struggling under difficult economic circumstances to fulfil its obligation to receive and provide for the welfare of South African refugees for a long time.

10. These projects have acquired an added priority for a number of reasons. First, South Africa did apply a number of economic pressures against Lesotho in an attempt to force it to close its borders to the victims of *apartheid* who found life in their own country intolerable. Secondly, South Africa did indicate that unless Lesotho changed its policy towards the South African refugees these pressures would be expanded. And, as the Council is aware, South Africa has created a dangerous security situation around its borders with Lesotho through acts of aggression, economic sabotage and general destabilization. On 9 December 1982 South Africa carried out an unwarranted act of aggression against my country resulting in loss of innocent lives and extensive damage to property.

11. The Council, in its resolution 527 (1982), condemned the South African act of aggression and called upon South Africa to declare publicly that it was never again going to attack Lesotho, either directly or through its proxies. The Council also demanded that South Africa should pay full and adequate compensation to Lesotho for the damage to life and property resulting from that act of aggression. A call was also made to the international community to extend necessary economic assistance to Lesotho in order to strengthen its capacity to receive and maintain South African refugees. The Council is aware that South Africa rejected resolution 527 (1982) out of hand and has demonstrated through a series of hostile acts against Lesotho that it has no respect at all for this Council and its resolutions.

12. My Government is grateful for the support and assistance it has received so far in alleviating the most immediate needs of the victims of the South African attack whose peaceful lives were disrupted.

13. The report that we are considering identifies a number of areas in which Lesotho could be assisted so as to ensure the welfare of refugees in a manner consistent with their security. Security in the context of Lesotho can be defined broadly as protection of the country and its people from outside attacks. It entails not only protection of the State and its citizens and the refugees residing within its borders from physical harm but also safeguards in such vital areas as food, health, education and work opportunities.

14. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Mission's report emphasized the need for vital economic support to enable Lesotho to receive and maintain refugees and to help them to be successfully integrated into its own society. The Mission recommended urgent assistance totalling $US 46 million for security, maize storage, employment, electricity, the new international airport, emergency medical services and the establishment of a fire brigade. These recommendations have been endorsed by my Government and are being submitted to the Council so that it may endorse them.

15. The members of the Security Council should be encouraged to note that a good number of countries and organizations have already shown sympathy and support for the report, and some have even made their pledges to the Lesotho Government. For its part, the Lesotho Government has established a fund to canalize national efforts in this regard. With the good support that is building up in all sectors of our population and among peoples of goodwill generally, we are confident that this fund will make a meaningful contribution. The fund is also intended to cover the effects of other similar attacks.

16. While on this subject, it will no doubt be of interest to members of the Council to note that following the Maseru massacre it was not long before it became apparent that South Africa was not fully satisfied with its previous attack. In the early hours of 27 January of this year, the opening day of the meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference in Maseru, South Africa insulted the international community which had gathered for that occasion by attempting to blow up a donor-funded abattoir project in Maseru on the banks of the Mohokare River, which forms part of the border with South Africa. This was soon to be followed by an attempt to blow up a water reservoir serving the capital of Lesotho. Not long thereafter a South African army helicopter was seen dropping rockets, which blew up fuel depots in Maseru. The catalogue is long, but more recently an intensification of these attacks has been seen on civilian targets, particularly in the districts.

17. The most recent acts of hostility and aggressiveness occurred only a few days ago, on 26 June, when heavily armed terrorists crossed from South Africa into Lesotho and attacked targets in the districts of Mohale's Hoek and Qacha's Nek. I wish to quote the following passage from a protest note sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lesotho to the Department of Foreign Affairs of South Africa:

> "Yesterday evening, 26 June 1983, attacks emanating from the Republic of South Africa were carried out by heavily armed men at Taung in the Mohale's Hoek district. A second attack was carried out against a police station and the Lesotho Paramilitary Force barracks in Qacha's Nek town.
>
> "In the attack at Taung heavily armed men were seen to have crossed into Lesotho from the Republic of South Africa at or near a place called Boesmanskop. In this attack several motorists lost their lives. A shop owned by Mr. Zwakala, a member of the Lesotho Parliament, and his residence were attacked with bazookas, resulting in considerable damage to the said property.
>
> "In the attack at Qacha's Nek the attackers also came from the Republic of South Africa and opened fire on the Lesotho Paramilitary Force based in Qacha's Nek town. They also attacked a Government garage, causing considerable damage. Two buses belonging to the Lesotho National Bus Corporation were destroyed.
>
> "In both the above-mentioned attacks the attackers came from the Republic of South Africa, and after completion of these acts they fled back into South Africa.
>
> "The Lesotho Government registers a very strong protest against the South African Government, as the Lesotho Government has in the past consistently affirmed that the country from which attacks are planned and perpetrated and which further gives sanctuary to these criminals also bears responsibility for the attacks.
>
> "The Lesotho Government regrets that these attacks come at a time when Lesotho is making efforts to strengthen good-neighbourly relations with the Republic of South Africa."

18. Some of these incidents have formally been reported to the Secretary-General. Our intention at this stage is not to take up these cases with the Council, but merely to bring the Council up to date with events which followed the adoption of resolution 527 (1982).

19. Members of the Council are fully aware of the recent unwarranted action taken by South Africa against Lesotho. The deliberate slow-down in the flow of traffic between Lesotho and South Africa was engineered by the Pretoria authorities in order to exacerbate the economic difficulties of Lesotho and undermine its political stability. As a result of the slow-down of traffic, many innocent people were exposed to inordinate delays at points of entry between Lesotho and South Africa under harsh winter conditions, and vital food and medical supplies entering Lesotho have been held up for no understandable reason. Various perishable goods have been lost, to the financial detriment of the business community in Lesotho.

20. It is events like these which help to emphasize the importance my Government attaches to the new Maseru international airport, which is now under construction, as it is aimed at providing Lesotho with an alternative route to the outside world. The people of Lesotho will be highly grateful and indebted to the international community for whatever assistance may be rendered in order to make the international airport a meaningful and viable option in solving Lesotho's transportation problems and facilitating contacts with the rest of the world.

21. In the light of these events it becomes even more necessary that the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Lesotho be adopted in order to set execution of its provisions into motion without any further delay.

22. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the understanding reached in the course of the Council's prior consultations, I shall suspend the meeting now for 10 minutes.

The meeting was suspended at noon and resumed at 12.15 p.m.

23. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them document S/15846, which contains the text of a draft resolution that has been prepared in the course of the Council's consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution. I shall now put this draft resolution to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 535 (1983)].

24. The PRESIDENT: The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

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SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2456th MEETING: 18 JULY 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council.* The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council.* The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2456th MEETING

Held in New York on Monday, 18 July 1983, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. LING Qing (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2456)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the Middle East:
   Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15863).

The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I should like, at the outset of this meeting, to express on behalf of the members of the Council deep appreciation to the President for the month of June, Mr. Elleck Kufakunesu Mashingaidze, representative of Zimbabwe. As President, Mr. Mashingaidze admirably guided the work of the Council last month with efficiency and great diplomatic skill.

Expression of welcome to the new representative of the Netherlands

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): On behalf of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to the new representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Max van der Stoel. We all look forward to working closely with him.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/15863)

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Lebanon in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the question on the agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Salem (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period 19 January to 12 July 1983.

5. Members of the Council also have before them document S/15871, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's consultations, and document S/15868, which contains the text of a letter dated 5 July 1983 from the representative of Lebanon addressed to the President of the Council.

6. The first speaker is the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Mr. Elie Salem. On behalf of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to him and invite him to make his statement.

For technical reasons, the meeting was suspended at 11.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

7. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I call on the Deputy Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Mr. Elie Salem.

8. Mr. SALEM (Lebanon): I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency. My congratulations to you acquire special significance in view of the support that your country, China, has given Lebanon. I am confident that, under your presidency, the deliberations of the Council will yield wide support for the cause of peace and stability in my country and in the region as a whole.

9. I take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General and to his assistants for the report on UNIFIL submitted to the Council. I also wish to pay a tribute to the countries contributing troops and logistic units to UNIFIL: Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal and Sweden. Those countries have won the gratitude of the Lebanese people for their readiness to risk the lives of their sons in helping the United Nations implement its decision on maintaining peace in a country which has fallen victim to regional and international conflicts. I must also commend

the distinguished service performed by General William Callaghan, his commanders and soldiers, and the United Nations staff under difficult and complicated conditions.

10. On 19 March 1978, in the wake of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, the Council established UNIFIL for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in southern Lebanon [*resolution 425 (1978)*]. While the Force, for reasons well known to the Council, has been unable fully to implement its mandate, it has nevertheless succeeded in ensuring relative peace and stability in the areas under its control. It has reinforced there the legitimate presence of the Government of Lebanon and provided hope for the Lebanese people that the present area of operation will be extended to cover the original mandate. Most importantly, UNIFIL's presence has been an eloquent manifestation of the commitment of the Council to stand by Lebanon in the face of continuing violation of its sovereignty, independence and unity.

11. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, Lebanon has witnessed dramatic changes. Fighting between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel has continued on and off in varying degrees of intensity. The fighting led to a massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and to the ouster of the PLO armed elements from southern Lebanon and Beirut. In response to the Israeli invasion, Syria has strengthened its military presence in Lebanon, and the PLO has concentrated its remaining forces in the areas in the north and east where the Syrians exercise effective control. These changes have intensified the problems of Lebanon, greatly exacerbated tension in the region and now pitted Syrian and Israeli forces against each other in a more threatening and more ominous manner than ever before. The very cause of regional and international peace is now at stake in Lebanon. In the midst of these developments, UNIFIL has remained steadfast, exercising patience and restraint in the face of continuing provocations and preserving in the face of chaos the hope of peace, stability and legitimacy.

12. Lebanon, conscious of the importance of a United Nations presence in the turbulent south, has been asking for the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, and the Council has always responded by renewing the mandate for periods varying from two to six months. We are now asking the Council to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of three months, until 19 October 1983. We are not requesting a change in the nature of the mandate or a new redeployment of the Force. We hope that the coming three months will witness the beginning of the end of an era of war and destruction. We have committed our full resources to this end, and we have reason to believe that our efforts will yield the fruits they deserve.

13. The Government of Lebanon is engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts to bring about the withdrawal of all unauthorized forces from Lebanon. These forces are now a source of danger to the very existence of Lebanon, a source of danger to their respective countries and causes, and a source of danger to the cause of peace in the Middle East. In the context of peace and security—the two major concerns of the Council—no problem on the international agenda is currently more urgent than defusing the time bomb in the region by effecting the withdrawal of all unauthorized forces from Lebanon.

14. Lebanon is conducting diplomatic efforts with all countries involved in the Lebanese crisis. Representatives of my country have been talking to representatives of your countries, either bilaterally or in the context of United Nations organs and institutions. We will continue these efforts, and we will apprise this august body of progress made. We shall, in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant United Nations decisions, resort to all means at our disposal, diplomatic or otherwise, to attain our goal. The goal is the liberation of all Lebanese territory in the shortest time possible, irrespective of the hardships, the sufferings and the frustrations.

15. We have the right to live in peace and freedom. Our neighbours have one right they might claim of us—namely, that our territory not be used as a base of hostility against them. We will uphold that right for them. Let them uphold our right for us. For too long—perhaps because we were too weak, too free, too lax—we were treated differently by friend and foe alike. Each claimed a right in our internal affairs, and each conceives of its security in terms of rights and gains on our terrain. The time has come for Lebanon to be treated like any other Member of the United Nations and not merely as a proving ground for ideologies, or a testing ground for weapons, or the probing rod of super-Power policies. Never again shall we tolerate this status. Give us the chance and we will put our house in order. We have learned from the storm not to build on sand again.

16. The Government of Lebanon has met the commitments required of it by the Council: it has sent troops to serve with UNIFIL. In addition, it has explored all possibilities to ensure total withdrawal. It is exerting maximum efforts to build a strong army, to reform public institutions, to maintain internal unity and to lay the foundations of a stable and strong State. Lebanon is attempting this Herculean task in the face of stubborn opposition from external forces, but Lebanon will neither waver nor falter. Others wonder: could the country be saved? Are parts of it going to be annexed? Is it going to be partitioned? Can that citadel of democracy, freedom and tolerance be saved from the clutches of jostling interests around it? Let me assure the Council that the Government of Lebanon, under the leadership of President Amin Gemayel, is determined to restore government authority over every inch of the territory. The Government is determined to save Lebanon intact, to preserve the unity and independence of the Lebanese people and to present Lebanon to the world community as a model worth cultivating. Lebanon needs the concerted attention of the Council to disengage it from the vortex of political conflicts in the region and thus save not only itself but also the cause of peace in the Middle

East. In rescuing Lebanon, the United Nations will rescue the State system of the Middle East and will herald an epoch of peace and stability in a region hitherto known for its tensions and conflicts.

17. The problems facing Lebanon are clearly greater than those addressed by the renewal or non-renewal of UNIFIL's mandate. In renewing the mandate of the Force, however, the Council will reaffirm to the world at large its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and unity of Lebanon.

18. I appear before the Council today to ask for the renewal of UNIFIL and to express to the Council, and through it to the troop-contributing countries, the gratitude of a thankful nation, a nation that will, like the Council and those countries, not hesitate also to lend a helping hand to a nation in need.

19. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it [*S/15871*]. If I hear no objection, I shall put it to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (resolution 536 (1983)).

20. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I shall now call upon those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the vote.

21. Ms. GROOMS (United States of America): I should like to take this opportunity, on behalf of my Government, to extend our congratulations to you, Mr. President, on your assumption of leadership of the Council during the month of July. We look forward to working productively and efficiently under your wise guidance. My Government would also like to thank the representative of Zimbabwe for the exemplary way he handled the affairs of the Council during the preceding month. Finally, my Government would like to welcome to the Council the new representative of the Netherlands.

22. The United States supports the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the mandate of UNIFIL be extended on an interim basis, and the request of the Government of Lebanon that the interim period be three months, or until 19 October 1983. The United States strongly supports the objectives of the Government of Lebanon to restore its sovereignty throughout its national territory and to secure the withdrawal of all unauthorized external forces from the country. Renewal today of UNIFIL's mandate will be a reaffirmation of the commitment of the international community to those objectives.

23. The United States extends its thanks to the Member States which have steadfastly and generously supported UNIFIL with troops and *matériel*. The officers and men of UNIFIL, four of whom gave their lives during the past six months, have served the cause of peace in the Middle East and merit the appreciation of all who seek an end to conflict in that troubled region.

24. Mr. LOUET (France) (*interpretation from French*): It gives me special pleasure to extend to you, Sir, my own congratulations and those of my Government on your accession to the presidency. You represent here at the United Nations a country with which France has always enjoyed friendly relations. We have had occasion to appreciate your qualities as a diplomat, and they will greatly assist the work of the Council. I should also like to extend my thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Mashingaidze, the representative of Zimbabwe, who presided over the work of the Council with great skill. In addition, I should like to extend the congratulations and best wishes of the French delegation to Mr. Max van der Stoel, the new representative of the Netherlands, whom it gives me great pleasure to welcome here. The Council will assuredly benefit from his experience as a statesman. Finally, I should like to welcome the presence here today of Mr. Salem, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon. The Council is greatly honoured at having him participate in our work. Mr. Salem knows that he can rely on the support of France during this difficult period for his country.

25. France has fully supported the request of the Lebanese Government to renew the mandate of UNIFIL for a period of three months, and it will maintain its contingent in that Force. On this occasion, we wish formally to reaffirm our full support for the action taken by the Government of Lebanon to restore its authority throughout the whole of its territory.

26. My delegation has noted with interest the report of the Secretary-General and approves its conclusions. The circumstances in which the Force was established have been radically changed. UNIFIL must continuously "cohabit" with a battalion of Israel Defence Forces based for an indefinite period throughout the territory UNIFIL is mandated to control. In addition, it must fulfil its role in spite of the presence of *de facto* forces and irregulars. The latter resort to such practices as hostage-taking, threats and the confiscation of vehicles, all of which call for firm disapproval on our part. For that reason, we urgently appeal to the Government of Israel not to limit UNIFIL's opportunities for action in the zone of operations established for it by the Council. In this connection, the French Government is particularly concerned over the exposed situation of the civilian population—in particular, the Palestinians—in Lebanon, especially in the southern part of the country. It would hope that the safety of the Palestinian civilians

might be assured in the best possible conditions. In its report of 24 June of this year, the International Committee of the Red Cross expressed the same concerns. Its representatives, who attempt to provide protection to Palestinian families in the southern camps, expressed serious concern. In particular, they visited the Ansar Camp, where the number of detainees, which currently stands at 5,000, has increased in recent weeks following arrests made by Israeli forces.

27. In this connection, it is fitting to recall Council resolution 523 (1982), which, in paragraph 3, states that the Council authorizes UNIFIL, with the consent of the Government of Lebanon,

> "to carry out . . . interim tasks in the humanitarian and administrative fields, as indicated in resolutions 511 (1982) and 519 (1982), and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all the inhabitants of the area without any discrimination".

28. The Lebanese Government, beset by a war that has been forced upon it, has undertaken a massive task of national reconstruction and the restoration of its authority throughout all of its territory. It is essential for us to lend it our support by responding positively to its appeal. For that reason, we unreservedly support the decision the Council has just taken to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further interim period of three months. As the Secretary-General has rightly stressed in paragraph 27 of his report:

> "the task of assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in southern Lebanon remains especially relevant in the present situation".

29. My Government fully shares that view. As I stated at the outset, my Government confirms its continued support to the Government of Lebanon in the action it is pursuing to restore its authority throughout the whole of its national territory, a territory freed from all foreign forces whose presence had not expressly been accepted by Lebanon. Our support is in keeping with our commitment to respect for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon. It is in that spirit and context that France, at the request of President Gemayel and of his Government, agreed to participate in the multinational force stationed in Beirut. That force, as we have always hoped and have stated since the beginning, should, at the appropriate time, be replaced by a United Nations force.

30. Before concluding, I should like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts to reduce tension in the region and to facilitate the action of the Lebanese Government. I also wish to extend my congratulations and best wishes to the officers and members of the Force.

31. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): First of all, I should like to take this opportunity to welcome you, Mr. President, to your high office for the month of July. We are sure that under your skilful leadership the Council will succeed in performing its important tasks. I should also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, the representative of Zimbabwe, Mr. Mashingaidze, who so effectively and clearly organized the work of the Council in June. I wish to take this opportunity also to welcome to the Council the new representative of the Netherlands, Mr. van der Stoel, and to wish him success in his work here. We also wish to welcome to the Council the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Mr. Salem.

32. Today the Council is once again considering the question of extending the mandate of UNIFIL. This is the thirteenth time that UNIFIL's mandate has been extended since the Force was established in 1978. This fact in and of itself is eloquent testimony to the absence of any positive improvement either in the settlement of the situation in Lebanon or in the implementation of the provisions of resolution 425 (1978).

33. Furthermore, the large-scale Israeli aggression against Lebanon in June last year complicated even further what was already a tangled web of Lebanese problems. It created a real and immediate threat to the freedom and independent existence of that State. Today, more than a year after that act of aggression, Israeli troops continue arrogantly to lord it over Lebanese soil. They are sowing terror and violence there, installing their own armed protégés and openly working towards perpetuating their occupation of yet one more Arab country.

34. Flouting the universally acknowledged norms of morality and law and the many decisions of the United Nations—first and foremost, Council resolutions which call for the immediate cessation of military activities and the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon—Tel Aviv, with the active support and assistance of its American patron and ally, is now striving to be rewarded for last year's bloody act of aggression.

35. With the whole world looking on, the strategic partners from Washington and Tel Aviv, in what has now become their customary cynical and high-handed manner, have together striven to impose on Lebanon such conditions for a settlement as are aimed at turning that country—to call things by their proper names—into an American-Israeli protectorate. Lebanon has been forced at gunpoint to accept the capitulationist agreement with Israel which infringes on the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese State and creates a threat to the security of neighbouring Arab countries. The implementation of this unfair agreement would be nothing other than a reward for the aggressor. It would undermine the international legal basis for a settlement of the conflict in Lebanon which is laid down in the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly on this subject. It would be simply playing into the hands of those who are attempting to secure one more springboard for acts of aggression against neighbouring Arab States.

36. It is essential to lay particular stress on the key factor of today's abnormal situation in Lebanon, namely, that the flagrant flouting by Israel of the sovereignty and independence of this Arab country became possible only with the consent and support of the United States.

37. The Soviet Union has pointed out on repeated occasions that all that the overseas patron and protector has to do is lift a finger and Tel Aviv would immediately call a halt to its piratical policy in Lebanon. Now, after the recent publication in the United States of the memoirs of certain highly placed officials in the Carter Administration, some specific facts have become known which confirm this. We believe it to be worth while to recall these facts here.

38. Fact number one goes back to September 1977, when there took place yet one more Israeli incursion into Lebanon. The memoirs of Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, state that, on 25 September 1977, the United States Administration decided, for a number of reasons, to bridle Israel. Late that night, President Carter sent a telegram to Begin stating that, if Israel did not immediately halt its operations in Lebanon, the United States would halt all military assistance to it. By the following morning, according to Brzezinski—that is, just a few hours later—he was already reporting to President Carter that Begin had given the order to his troops to leave Lebanon. Such is the effectiveness of the influence of Washington on Tel Aviv, if, of course, Washington wants to exercise it.

39. Fact number two goes back to June 1978. At that time, Washington was put out at the fact that Israel, after another large-scale incursion into Lebanon, had left for the so-called *de facto* forces of Major Haddad armoured transports and artillery pieces which had been received from the United States. At that time, as is stated in the memoirs of former Secretary of State Vance, President Carter once again sent a telegram to Begin, stating that, if Israel did not withdraw those American-made weapons from Lebanon, the United States Administration would be compelled to inform Congress of a violation of the Arms Export Control Act. In those circumstances, according to Vance, all United States military assistance would have been automatically halted. Once again the call from Washington had an instantaneous effect. According to Vance, Begin immediately—I repeat, immediately—took those armaments out of Lebanon.

40. If we are recalling these concrete examples, which have now become public knowledge, it is not simply to demonstrate with crystal clarity the extent to which Israel, in its aggressive policy in the Middle East and in this case in Lebanon, is wholly dependent on the United States. The important thing is to stress what further evolution in United States policy has occurred since that time with regard to Israel's piratical actions against Lebanon.

41. In June last year, when Israel launched its biggest and bloodiest act of aggression in Lebanon, Washington did nothing whatsoever to prevent Israel from carrying out its criminal plans. Moreover, it saw to it that American weapons, which had been used for the slaughter in southern Lebanon and Beirut, continued to reach the aggressor in an uninterrupted flow. It was precisely for that very purpose that in August last year the United States, in isolation, blocked the Soviet draft resolution in the Council which provided for the cessation of arms deliveries and military assistance to the Israeli aggressor. By so doing, the United States assumed full responsibility for encouraging the aggressor.

42. The reasons why Washington is now not only unwilling to restrain Israel but also actively helping it lord it over Lebanon are quite clear. Beginning in 1981, Israel has been a strategic partner of the United States. This is a qualitatively new situation. On the strength of this partnership, Israel, with United States money, United States weapons and United States political support, is today in Lebanon and throughout the Middle East securing not only its own goals but also those of Washington.

43. It is therefore not surprising that the United States, which at the time voted in favour of Council resolution 509 (1982) demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon of Israeli troops, subsequently stated that that resolution was not relevant and had become outmoded. It is not surprising either that the United States, in association with Israel, directly helped that country to impose this unfair agreement upon Lebanon. Nor is it surprising, finally, that on Lebanese territory, along with Israeli occupying forces there have appeared—under cover of the fig-leaf of the so-called multinational force—occupation troops from the United States and certain other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The protracted stationing in Lebanon of both Israeli and multinational—in practice, American—forces is in contravention of Council resolutions which reaffirm the responsibility of the United Nations for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon. All of this is part of one single whole; all of it is a reflection of the line of the United States which is aimed at seeing that, in partnership with Israel, a sinister military bridgehead is created in the Middle East. The purpose of this far-reaching strategy is to dictate capitulationist terms to Arab countries and peoples in order to turn back the clock of history, to gain control of Arab oil and to recolonize the Middle East. This is what the most recent events in and around Lebanon tell us.

44. Settlement of the situation in Lebanon must and can be achieved, not by means of separate deals or arm-twisting behind the scenes but on the basis of strict and unswerving compliance with resolutions of the Council which demand the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from that country.

45. It is precisely within this context that the Soviet delegation views the question of extending the mandate of UNIFIL. As is clear from the report submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General, the activities of the Force have continued to be carried out under difficult

circumstances created by the actions of the Israeli occupying authorities. It is clear from the report that Israel continues actively to support and encourage its puppets in the south of Lebanon. It is attempting to impose upon the Lebanese its own protégés and use them to supplant organs of local administration. It is continuing to provoke incidents with the military personnel of UNIFIL, posing a threat to their life and security. These acts by the Israeli authorities towards UNIFIL personnel are a direct violation of previous resolutions of the Council, in particular resolution 523 (1982), in paragraph 2 of which the Council:

> "*Insists* that there shall be no interference under any pretext with the operations of the Force and that it shall have full freedom of movement in the discharge of its mandate."

46. It is the duty of the Council to ensure respect for its resolutions and to put an end to the provocative conduct of a State Member of the United Nations towards the international Force operating under the United Nations flag.

47. In the light of the recommendations of the Secretary-General and the request made by the Lebanese Government, and also bearing in mind that the goals and functions of UNIFIL will continue to be determined by the mandate laid down in resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent decisions of the Council on this subject, the Soviet delegation has found it possible not to object to the extension of the mandate of the Force.

48. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): Sir, I should like first of all to extend my congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank you and members of the Council for the kind words addressed to me as the new representative of the Netherlands in the Council.

49. I now turn to the United Nations peace-keeping Force in southern Lebanon. We are all aware of the difficult circumstances under which the Force is now obliged to operate. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequent developments in the area have made it practically impossible for UNIFIL to carry out the mandate given it by the Council under resolution 425 (1978), paragraph 3 of which states that the Council decided to establish the Force

> "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area".

50. These difficulties notwithstanding, we felt that UNIFIL still had a stabilizing effect on the situation in the area. Moreover, the Force was able to play a useful humanitarian role, and its presence indicated that it might be available for duties connected with a future withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon. The Council has on several occasions—the last being on 18 January of this year [*2411th meeting*]—extended the mandate of the Force, with interim periods of varying duration. For its part, the Netherlands Government has agreed to continue its participation in UNIFIL. However, when the Council discussed the UNIFIL mandate in January of this year, we made it clear that any continued participation would be subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, which in our view have not been met, or have only very partially been met.

51. Outstanding among developments which have taken place since the previous extension of UNIFIL's mandate by the Council is the agreement signed on 17 May 1983 between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Lebanese Repubic. The Netherlands has welcomed this agreement, which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and which would terminate the prolonged state of war between the two countries. We have also expressed the hope that this agreement will contribute to the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East and that it will receive the support of all parties in the region. It goes without saying that the Netherlands Government is deeply concerned at the fact that, two months after the signing of the agreement, its implementation is still very much in doubt, for in order to attain the Lebanese Government's objective that all external forces withdraw from its territory as soon as possible, it should be able to count on the co-operation of all concerned.

52. The Government of Lebanon has requested the renewal of the present mandate for a further interim period of three months. Although we understand the very difficult position of the Government of Lebanon, which prompts it to ask for another temporary renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, we think the time has come for the Council to face the fact that UNIFIL's mandate, as established by Council resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent resolutions, has lost much of its meaning. However, during the past six months it has become increasingly difficult for UNIFIL to carry out what remains of its mandate.

53. Actions and incidents caused by the Israel Defence Forces and local militia have further undermined the authority of UNIFIL in the area and seriously called into question UNIFIL's ability to carry out its main task nowadays—that is, to protect the local population. We urgently repeat our call to the Government of Israel to respect UNIFIL's mandate and to stop obstructing the Force from performing its duties.

54. Bearing in mind that UNIFIL has now already, for more than a year, been largely prevented from carrying out the tasks envisaged for it and that it does not seem likely at present that the Force will be able to assume useful functions in the near future, my Government has come to the conclusion that prolongation of UNIFIL on the basis of the present mandate could not and should not be indefinite. With regard to the Netherlands participation in UNIFIL, I am instructed to inform the Council that the Netherlands Government has agreed to

its further continuation, under the existing mandate, for a period of up to three months as from 19 July. We have therefore just voted in favour of the draft resolution presented to us today.

55. However, barring entirely new circumstances which would enable my Government to reconsider its position, the Netherlands battalion will be withdrawn from Lebanon as from 19 October. The Netherlands decision to withdraw is linked to UNIFIL's present mandate, which in our view has largely lost its meaning. However, our willingness to agree to a further extension for the months ahead offers ample opportunity to consider the future. We intend to remain in close contact with the Government of Lebanon, with the Secretary-General and with our friends in UNIFIL and with all other parties concerned to assess any useful contribution that UNIFIL could make after 19 October.

56. Mr. MARGETSON (United Kingdom): May I join in congratulating you, Sir, on assuming the office of President. We are already greatly indebted to you for your help and your wisdom in informal consultations of the Council, and we admire your distinguished qualities, which we know you will certainly bring to the presidency. May I also thank Mr. Mashingaidze, the representative of Zimbabwe, for the excellence of his presidency. He steered the Council with great skill in some very difficult business last month, and therefore earned our gratitude. I should be grateful if my delegation's thanks could be passed on to him. May I also join you, Mr. President, in welcoming Mr. van der Stoel, the new representative of the Netherlands. He has had such a distinguished career in international relations, including being Foreign Minister of the Netherlands for some years, that I know we shall all benefit greatly from his presence at the United Nations. He will no longer be just a bird of passage with other Foreign Ministers at the General Assembly.

57. It is not for me to answer the extraordinarily unbalanced and unhelpful account of recent history in Lebanon that my Soviet colleague has chosen to give us. I want instead to confine my contribution to the particular matter before us—namely, the future of UNIFIL.

58. My delegation was very pleased to join in the vote renewing the mandate of UNIFIL. The Secretary-General's report on UNIFIL which is before us is very valuable. We are most grateful to him for it. I believe it has made a convincing case for the renewal of the mandate.

59. Nevertheless, we feel that the Council should ask itself—not necessarily now, but over the next three months—about the future of UNIFIL, what its purposes are, and how it may fulfil them.

60. As the representative of France has said, circumstances have changed dramatically since UNIFIL was set up. I think it is generally accepted that the Force is no longer carrying out what I would describe as a conventional or traditional United Nations peace-keeping role—that is to say, the role of holding the ring militarily while politicians and diplomats attempt to solve the underlying problems.

61. My Government believes that UNIFIL is playing a helpful, protective and humanitarian role in southern Lebanon. But we share some of the concern expressed by the representative of the Netherlands. In particular, we are concerned that the troop contributors are being asked to undertake something different from the conventional United Nations peace-keeping role and that they are being asked to do this in conditions of considerable difficulty and even danger. I should therefore like to pay a sincere tribute to all members of UNIFIL in the field for their continuing courage and tenacity.

62. There are two points to which I should like to draw attention. First, in his report, the Secretary-General has a number of criticisms to make of the treatment of UNIFIL by an occupying Power. Secondly, there is a shortfall in the UNIFIL account of almost $170 million.

63. I believe it is shameful that the troop contributors, some of which are developing countries that need financial resources badly and that are already making a sacrifice in providing troops for the Force, should be penalized for playing their part in what is a noble cause. Anyone who has sympathy for, and understanding of, the problems of developing countries must be shocked that they are being treated in this way because of the unwillingness of a group of Member countries to share the financial burden of UNIFIL.

64. My country believes that to withdraw UNIFIL would be to remove what the Secretary-General describes in his report as an element of stability in what, alas, has become an unstable land.

65. It is no exaggeration to say that the very existence of a founding Member of the United Nations continues to be at stake.

66. We have just adopted a resolution reiterating our strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its recognized international boundaries. At their meeting at Stuttgart on 19 June, the leaders of the European Community said that

> "the return to full sovereignty and final peace in Lebanon requires the complete and prompt withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory, except for those whose presence may be requested by the Lebanese Government".

They also confirmed

> "their full support for President Gemayel and his Government in their determined action to re-establish their authority over the entire territory of Lebanon" [*see S/15867*].

67. Perhaps we should be asking ourselves whether there is anything the Council can do, beyond renewing the UNIFIL mandate for a further interim period, to help the Lebanese Government regain that territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence to which we have once more given our support.

68. The **PRESIDENT** (*interpretation from Chinese*): The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

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